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I. Introduction 
———————————————————————————————————— 
 Over my years at Macalester, my study of legal scholarship presented me with a 
dilemma that I had not found solution for: the law is limited by its foundation of 
categories. In my first Constitutional Law class, we studied cases organized thematically 
by what right it was argued under. The first amendment had its case law, then the second 
amendment, and so on and so on until we had covered the entire Bill of Rights. In all of 
these discussions and doctrine, it was clear that the tests and rationale the Justices created 
were open to interpretation and debate. This is what makes the study of Constitutional 
Law so interesting to me. Every doctrine has a utility depending on who it is protecting, 
and it can be manipulated to serve an ends if interpreted favorably. Yet, what 
dumbfounded me the most was the utility of the privacy doctrine in the abortion case law. 
After taking women’s biology, it seemed clear that the right to control ones reproductive 
life is an essential equality issue, not one of privacy. But where was this legal 
interpretation?  
 When Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) brought marriage equality under equal 
protection, I found myself questioning the utility of the privacy doctrine again as 
reproductive rights was under constant attack and gay rights succeeded in its legal battle. 
My intrigue was deepened after Harvard history professor, Jill Lepore, wrote a op-ed on 
the comparison between reproductive rights and marriage equality. She presented her 
readers with a tentative conclusion: “Over time, arguments based on a right to privacy 
have tended to weaken and crack; arguments based on equality have grown only 
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stronger.”  In my mind, this critique was compounded with Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s recent 1
dissent record and her open critique towards Roe’s utility of the privacy doctrine as well. 
Lepore’s comparison seemed astute to me as her use of a case study was a way to 
overcome the narrow scope legal analysis is usually limited to. The static nature of law 
seemed to fall short of representing women’s issues adequately. Thus, using the success 
of marriage equality as a background to the contrasting story of privacy and reproductive 
rights was a useful analysis to gain insight into the legal doctrine developed thus far in 
the Court. To begin, I wanted to understand the influence of these two movements and 
their legal interpretations. Specifically, I wanted to gain insight into what legal 
interpretation and rhetoric would best serve the reproductive rights movement going 
forward.  
 The significance of this project comes through on both a material and theoretical 
level. In practice, a deeper understanding of the rhetoric used within the Court can inform 
how advocates outside the Court can curtail language to their advantage to progressively 
get across their argument. For example, the current “Host” bill introduced in Oklahoma 
would require a women to obtain consent from her sexual partner to get an abortion.  2
While this is a clear violation of the constitutional right to abortion established in Roe and 
solidified in Casey, the conversation within the state legislature centers around the 
woman’s body as a “host” of the fetus and the argument for male control over her 
reproductive capabilities. In response to the bill’s introduction, reproductive rights 
 Lepore, Jill. “To Have and to Hold”. The New Yorker, 25 May. 2015, pp. 117.  1
 Oklahoma House Bill 15492
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advocate Amanda Allen responded to the bills unconstitutionality by claiming that this is 
“a fruitless effort to shame and stigmatize women who are seeking abortion care and it is 
completely and unequivocally unconstitutional.”  While Allen directs her response 3
towards the obvious break in precedent in the Host bill, she does not respond to the 
deeper issue at play within this rhetoric—the autonomy of women over their bodies. In 
order to take reproductive rights off the defensive strategy and more towards making 
proactive change for women, it’s important to understand the legal doctrine and inherent 
rhetoric available to litigants.  
 The recent reproductive rights cases of Hobby Lobby (2014) and Whole Women’s 
Health (2016) provide more material that had not been analyzed with the same lens as 
Lepore introduced in her analysis. Additionally, the 2016 election made defunding 
Planned Parenthood a wedge issue, heightening the risk of dismantling the right to an 
abortion in America. On a theoretical level, the increased concentration on identity 
politics within feminist theory has pushed the discipline as a whole to utilize more 
intersectional analysis, and subsequently there had been a drop-off in legal interpretation. 
This is because many feminists believe that law is not the best platform to discuss 
intersectional identities and can actually be a hindrance for robust advocacy.  Thus, my 4
perspective of feminist legal theory is less explored and lends opportunity for insight into 
the advocacy of the reproductive rights movement.  
 Smith, Jordan. "Oklahoma Lawmakers Want Men to Approve All Abortions." The Intercept. 3
N.p., 13 Feb. 2017. Web. 25 Mar. 2017.
 Dean Spade, "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 4
and Society 38, no. 4 (Summer 2013): 1031-1055. 
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 In this thesis, I investigate, what is the constitutional basis for women’s equality? 
To do this, I begin with Jill Lepore’s contribution and argument for the switch to equality 
doctrine from a privacy legal basis for abortion cases. A major part of my project is 
exploring the feminist criticisms behind both a privacy and equality argument to come to 
my own conclusion into what I believe the best way forward is. My initial intentions was 
to gather more in depth support for the switch to an equality argument for reproductive 
rights. However, my investigation into the specific ways equality doctrine has been 
applied to cases dealing with female autonomy showed me a much narrower concept of 
equality the Court draws on. If not careful, equality doctrine can be used as a way to 
perpetuate very traditional and limiting logic for female bodies and their autonomy. I will 
leave this research with a much more tenuous and nuanced suggestion towards utilizing 
arguments based in equality for reproductive rights. I contribute to this work by focusing 
on how privacy and equality legal doctrine has specifically informed women’s autonomy 
through the arguments litigants use, and the interpretations Justices make based on these 
rights. I provide a analysis that highlights the draw backs and benefits of both privacy and 
equality for a reproductive rights movement that is focused on advancing female 
autonomy. Using a combination of liberal and legal feminist theory, I wish to find hope in 
the synergy between equality and privacy frameworks that if used together, can give way 
to a robust concept of female autonomy that will advance the feminist goal of articulating 
what gender equality requires in a patriarchy.  
 I will begin by recounting the rise of the equal protection clause for women 
through gender discrimination case law. To begin the first chapter, I will provide a 
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theoretical background of equality to illustrate the feminist interpretation that I focus on 
for this thesis. The history of gender discrimination jurisprudence will bring us to the 
exclusion of reproductive rights within a equality argument category and the subsequent 
use of a privacy argument instead. Chapter two will focus on the right to privacy and 
reproductive rights case law. I will lay out how equal protection was not explicitly 
utilized in reproductive rights case law, but came up in litigants arguments in several 
cases. I will discuss the re-emergence of equality arguments within this privacy 
framework showcase the merits of an equality argument for the social movement in order 
to convey why critiques of the privacy argument have driven scholars such as Lepore to 
advocate for equality instead. In the third chapter, I will turn to the challenges and 
limitations of both the privacy and equality argument by describing the lessons we can 
take away from marriage equality. Finally, I will end with my suggestions for the road 
ahead.  
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Chapter 1 
A. Theoretical Background: Privacy and Equality 
———————————————————————————————————— 
If you had to choose between your privacy or your equality, which would you 
pick? It’s an impossible question to answer, but to understand why it must be posed in the 
debate surrounding reproductive rights in America, it is important to critique the feminist 
utility of the concept of privacy and equality in law. This is what I strive to do through a 
case history of reproductive rights, gender discrimination, and marriage equality. Inherent 
in all of these social movements is a debate on morality, oppressive patriarchal structures, 
assimilation, and the consequences of an American liberal tradition embedded in the 
concepts of both equality and privacy. To begin, I will recount the origins of equality in 
general and how it is understood in our legal structure. I will then describe feminist 
positions and where I stand in the feminist interpretation of the equality and privacy 
doctrine. 
 Equality has a strained history in American Law. This is not surprising, as one 
prominent equality theorist, Ronald Dworkin, has described equality as a highly 
contested, theoretical, and unavoidable concept: “People who praise it or disparage it 
disagree about what they are praising or disparaging.”  People who value equality, 5
egalitarians, might share their esteem for the concept for a variety of reasons. Some 
theories assume the innate good in equality, some see it as a means for other forms of 
 Dworkin, Ronald, 2000, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge: 5
Harvard University Press.
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justice, and others conversely do not treat equality in society as a unconditional good. 
Non-egalitarians are skeptical of a system that may justify lowering the overall worth of 
society to make everyone the same. While all of these branches of philosophy are highly 
theoretical, their discourse illustrates that when someone conceptualizes “equality”, many 
value assumptions must go into whatever form of equality they are advocating for. 
Historians have conceded that there is no singular ideal for equality that is accepted.   6
However, the blueprint for equality in an American context traces to philosophers like 
Aristotle, Hobbes, and Locke.  Equality theory has a prominent place in the American 7
political and legal system.  
 For founding fathers Hobbes and Locke, any political system needs equality to 
ensure fair competition among political actors. They believed that men were the political 
actors, and their masculinity was inherently violent and in search of glory. If this “state of 
nature” was left unchecked, political society would end in destruction. The solution was a 
social contract that would bind men together with reciprocity. The social contract needed 
a leader to maintain the legitimacy and enforcement of the social contract. After a leader 
was established, the social contract required men to respect the boundaries of their 
property and put limitations on masculine violence. Included in the right to property was 
the right to control women and divide them among the households. This paternal social 
order made every male citizen like a king in his own household, responsible for its well 
being and secured that others would not try to destroy it. The social contract was based on 
 Rae, Douglas, et al., 1981, Equalities, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.6
 Gosepath, Stefan, "Equality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), 7
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/>.
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a mutual equality that made the agreement reciprocal, it was paternal (the power stemmed 
from the male), and it was based on property rights and voting rights that were 
determined by race, gender, and class.  The social contract thus placed a certain value on 8
equality in-so-far that the contract could remain reciprocal only with equal players in the 
political system. The equality stemmed from equal opportunity to own property and 
participate in the civil sphere.  
 If the political system rests on a promise of equality, then the law must protect it. 
At its minimum, equal respect recognizes the equal worth or dignity of all humans and 
“any political theory abandoning this notion of equality will not be found plausible 
today.”  The field of philosophy has come to understand legal equality as a “strict 9
equality” in that  
 “from the principle of formal equality, all citizens of a society must have equal  
 general rights and duties. These rights and duties have to be grounded in general  
 laws applying to everyone…. every person should have the same freedom to  
 structure his or her life, in the most far-reaching manner possible and in a   
 peaceful and appropriate social order.”  10
 This concept of equality can be traced to Aristotle and has been adopted in the American 
political system. Here, equality calls for two premises. One, people must have autonomy 
or “freedom to structure his or her life.” Relevant to my research, it is important to note 
 Hobbes, Thomas, 1651, Leviathan, With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, ed. 8
by Edwin Curley, Indianapolis: Hackett 1994.; Pateman, Carole (1988). The Sexual Contract. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
 Gosepath, Stefan, "Equality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), 9
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/>.; 
Vlastos, Gregory, 1962, “Justice and Equality”, in: R. Brandt (ed.), Social Justice, Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall; reprinted in: J. Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1984, pp. 41-76; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), Equality. Selected 
Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997, pp. 120-133.
 Gosepath, Stefan (2011)10
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how the concepts of equality, privacy and autonomy have been connected and 
interdependent on each other, even from the start of their philosophical roots.  Second, 
the law must treat people the same, or deliver formal equality. To have formal equality is 
to have leveled subjectivity. For this ideal, you must treat similar cases alike and different 
cases differently in proportion to their differences.  This concept makes sense in terms of 11
the American legal system. Equal protection law accounts for the normative and societal 
discrimination protected classes face that effects their equal treatment. If a law treats 
someone differently because of their protected class, there must be a compelling state 
interest.  
 Criticism of the liberal interpretation and usefulness of equality has been present 
in discourses along race, class, and able lines. The Civil Rights movement, Affirmative 
Action, and disability law all asked if equal opportunity is enough. More has been 
demanded of the law to try and undue the coded hierarchies many identities live in 
everyday. Simple opportunity only hides the institutional barriers that work against any 
protected class in American society. The law has been persuaded to give up the liberal 
ideal and give way to a positive rights approach. The New Deal era and the start of an 
American Welfare State changed the way the state is expected to take care of their 
citizens. Sometimes the state must give resources to citizens to make up for the 
disadvantage they face due to their identity. Inherent to this is, of course, more criticism 
 Gosepath, Stefan, "Equality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), 11
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/>.; 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The complete works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.’ Baehr, Amy R., "Liberal Feminism", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/feminism-liberal/>.
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of the ways the state can curtail its programs to perpetuate the status quo while managing 
to still seem paternalistic. 
B. Feminist Liberal and Legal Theory  
———————————————————————————————————— 
 Liberal feminists value procedural equality and seek to treat similar cases alike 
and different cases differently in proportion to their differences, but there is still 
disagreement about what this means.  Feminist scholars may disagree about how to best 12
achieve gender equality, but much of the discourse focuses on how to account for 
differences in the most genuine way, without backlash, isolation, or compromising the 
goal of equality.  Here, we see how many feminists agree that they want gender equality, 13
but often refer to many different concepts or methods of achieving this. Thus, there are 
many branches of feminism, some in stark disagreement. Often a real world example to 
illustrate the theoretical variety of feminism is the discourse surrounding prostitution. 
While some feminists view prostitution as rape due to the economic disempowerment of 
women that limits their ability to make free choice and thus advocate for the complete 
elimination of sex work, while other branches view sex work as a breakaway from the 
sexual subordination of women and wish to make sex work safer for females who utilize 
 Baehr, Amy R., "Liberal Feminism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 12
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/
feminism-liberal/>.
 Baehr, Amy R. (2013), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/13
win2013/entries/feminism-liberal/>.; Rhode, Deborah (1997). Speaking of Sex: The Denial of 
Gender Inequality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.; Minow, Martha (1990). Making All the 
Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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agency to choose this employment.  These groups of two feminists may completely 14
disagree on every step in their analysis of position law, but all would say that gender 
equality is the goal behind their method.  15
  One strain of feminist theory dealing directly with equality and privacy revolves 
around how the dichotomy of public/private and equality/difference exists in a patriarchal 
social order and works to limit female autonomy. Political theorists such as Carole 
Pateman have criticized the American Liberal tradition for relying on the subordination of 
women through what Pateman calls the “sexual contract.” In order for the liberal ideal to 
permeate though the consciousness of society, there must be a threat of disorder. Political 
subjects agree to give up power to a leader with the promise that their property and 
liberty within their private life will be protected. In this context, liberty is the restraint of 
the state to interfere in private ownership and thus control over the property political 
across have. Pateman claims that women are included within the property men have and 
their presence is only valuable in so far as it serves the man. Thus, there is a necessary 
dichotomy between the public and private. Pateman claims that the maintenance of a 
public/private boundary sphere ideology needs the feminine to be subordinate to the 
masculine and tied to the private sphere. Female autonomy is very limited as a result of 
this construction. The social contract in a patriarchy requires the limited mobility of 
femininity (women) between the two spheres and the maintenance of masculinity (men) 
 Shrage, Laurie, "Feminist Perspectives on Sex Markets,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 14
Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2016/entries/feminist-sex-markets/>.; MacKinnon, C. and A. Dworkin (eds.), 1997, 
In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
 https://aljahom.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/image48.png15
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in both. Without this tension, there would be no masculine anxiety to protect ownership 
over property and thus the need for a leader. 
 Scholarship spearheaded by Wendy Brown has taken this argument a step further 
to show that this dichotomy is maintained not only through marriage or explicit contracts 
that subordinate the feminine, but through rights discourse itself.  Brown argues that 16
“the legacy of gender subordination Pateman identified as historically installed in the 
sexual-contract is to be found not in contemporary contract relations but in the terms of 
liberal discourse that configure and organize liberal jurisprudence, public policy, and 
popular consciousness”.  Thus, Brown expands the maintenance of the patriarchy to 17
reside not only in contractual relations, but in liberal discourse itself, particularly, in the 
discourse surrounding both privacy and equality. While Brown has illustrated that the law 
is one place that maintains a discourse of exclusion of women through liberal values such 
as privacy and equality, a solution using a feminist method has still not been identified. 
 I wish to focus on one “ongoing area of theoretical exploration among feminists,” 
namely “the weight and scope to be given to any distinction between the public and the 
private in reproduction, family structures, work arrangements, and sexual 
relationships…”  that has been debated and analyzed through multiple feminist 18
perspectives. Here, I have identified a collision between liberal feminism and feminist 
 Brown, Wendy. "Liberalism’s Family Values." States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late 16
Modernity (1995): 135-165.
 Brown, Wendy (1995)17
 Baehr, Amy R., "Liberal Feminism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 18
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/
feminism-liberal/>.
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legal theory, both of which provide an extremely useful perspective on the American 
legal system. As stated above, liberal feminism values procedural equality, yet has no 
consensus on how to best achieve this ideal. Feminist legal theory critiques the law’s 
ability to legitimize the status quo and represent interpretations as objective. A major 
point of debate within the discipline is the interpretation and value judgment given to 
“sexual difference.” Feminists agree that the gender difference is a women’s ability to 
give birth, yet there is disagreement over how this should be accounted for in our laws. 
Should the law treat men and women the same, or account for the differences between 
them? Sexual difference is a convoluted concept within legal analysis since feminist legal 
scholars agree that “law makes systemic bias invisible, normal, entrenched and thus 
difficult to identify and oppose.” The subordination of women is maintained by an 
unquestioning of what the private sphere is, and the states refrain from interfering.  19
Legal feminist analysis demands the scrutiny of laws that identifies bias towards this 
oppressive way of thinking whenever is occurs in the legal system.  Feminist legal 20
theory is thus the practice of articulating what equality requires in a patriarchy. Liberal 
feminist theory holds that autonomy is a pre-condition for equality, where autonomy for 
women means the ability to move between the private and public just as freely as men. 
This would mean no barriers or assumed positionally of women or men in either domain. 
This is part of the feminist agenda, and will start with the dismantling of the assumption 
 Pateman, Carole. “Sexual Contract.” John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2014.19
 MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.” Harvard University Press, 20
1989.
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that the feminine belongs in a subordinate and privatized position to the masculine in a 
public/private dichotomy in the American liberal tradition.  
 Feminist liberal critiques generally argue that autonomy for women is limited by 
the inherited gendered institutions and traditions we live in that make it much more 
challenging for women to authentically author her own life.  It follows that in a liberal 21
political system, it is the state’s duty to provide a foundation of autonomy that goes 
beyond the protection of the male subject in a gendered system and to protect the 
female’s autonomy as well. Feminist legal theory uncovers the assumption that the 
neutral subject in law is male, consequently the reproductive abilities of women is what 
constitutes gender “difference.”  Given these many layers of assumed bias against 22
women, there is yet no distinct concept of privacy for women that informs their 
autonomy. I believe this female autonomy that should be protected differently than male 
autonomy due to women’s ability to become pregnant and have children. The state should 
have a different interpretation of privacy to ensure protection of autonomy. So far, case 
law has recognized that a women’s autonomy and equality is connected to her ability to 
control her reproductive life.  Much like feminist theory does not have a clear answer on 23
how to guarantee female autonomy, legal doctrine lacks a robust answer to this question 
 Stein, Laura. “Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of 21
Privacy and Equality." Minnesota Law Review 77.1153 (1993): n. pag. LexisNexis. Web. 1 Mar. 
2017.
 MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.” Harvard University Press, 22
1989.
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)23
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as well. Some scholars argue that the courts cannot account for intersectional issues and 
thus is not the proper place to theorize female autonomy.   24
 The push for identity politics has taken over much of feminist theory, yet I wish to 
refocus on the role of the Courts and jurisprudence’s ability to inform and perpetuate the 
discourse of social movements.  The abortion debate has traditionally focused on the 25
ability of women to access abortion, it is extremely important to recognize that this 
rhetoric is not representative of all women’s denial of reproductive justice. A more 
inclusive representation of women’s experiences in the abortion debate should entail 
intersectional issues to constitute a more nuanced understanding of women’s limited 
autonomy over their reproductive lives. For some, this may mean limited abortion access 
while for other it may mean forced sterilization.  The important take away is that the 26
reproductive justice movement is a social movement that has informed the legal rhetoric 
surrounding women’s equality, and thus influences how we construct and treat women’s 
position in society. Understanding the limitations of any one thread of change, I wish to 
investigate the feminist utility of the privacy and equality doctrine through a case study of 
mainly reproductive rights.   
 The reproductive rights of women is encompassed in a protection of privacy the 
state must ensure. While the Court may have interpreted this to mean that laws cannot 
 Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 24
Against Women of Color." Stanford law review (1991): 1241-1299.
 Brown, Wendy. "Liberalism’s Family Values." States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late 25
Modernity (1995): 135-165.
 Dean Spade, "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 26
and Society 38, no. 4 (Summer 2013): 1031-1055.
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restrict abortion if there is a undue burden on the women’s right to an abortion, this 
variety of feminist analysis goes deeper. Women should be “free of the limits set by 
patriarchal paternalistic and moralistic laws: Patriarchal paternalistic laws restrict 
women's options on the grounds that such limits are in women's interest.”  In the 27
abortion debate, female autonomy is tied to an ideal of the feminine being privatized and 
to the continuation of motherhood for women who can assimilate to the private/public 
dichotomy. This concept of autonomy can be contrasted with the feminist interpretation 
of female autonomy that “can never be separated from an affirmative relationship to our 
‘flesh.’”  Feminists painfully recognize that the ability to give birth constitutes the 28
“gender difference” that the law has traditionally used as the basis for female 
subordination.  Some feminists have wanted to deal with this difference by showing that 29
women are just like men and should be treated just like them. Yet, others note that women 
are just as good as men men, and women can give birth.   30
 MacKinnon began the quest for a Feminist State by uncovering the harmful 
effects of law’s neutrality. She strove to uncover the harmful discourse law perpetrates 
surrounding the private/public dichotomy that informs women’s limited autonomy. 
Scholars such as Drucilla Cornell have expanded on this work to show the usefulness of a 
Baehr, Amy R., "Liberal Feminism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 27
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/
feminism-liberal/>.
 Cornell, Drucilla, and Catharine A. MacKinnon. "Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and 28
Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State." (1991): 2251.
 Cornell and McKinnon (1991)29
 MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.” Harvard University Press, 30
1989.
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“equivalent rights” framework. Cornell articulates that equivalent rights “do not repeat 
the ‘separate but equal’ argument” and  are “valuable to feminists precisely because it 
allows for a ‘positive’ program to guarantee women’s equality of well-being and 
capability.”  The concepts of negative and positive rights have been utilized by feminist 31
legal analysis and provide a useful framework for the feminist agenda.  
C. Positive and Negative Rights 
———————————————————————————————————— 
 The Bill of Rights is written as negative rights: the state will not infringe on the 
freedom of citizens. However, these same rights can be understood in a positive 
interpretation. For example, feminists have discussed the possible use of a positive 
interpretation of a right to privacy. For abortion, this would mean that the state has a 
obligation to fund abortions, not just agree to not infringe on a woman’s access to 
services.  Negative rights is a refrain from government interference, while a positive 32
right is an affirmative protection. Both the equality and privacy doctrine have these 
elements within their jurisprudence. For equality, treating men and women similarly 
would be a negative interpretation of a right to equality, since it demands less from the 
state. A positive approach would be to demand services such as maternity leave, 
childcare, abortion services, etc. to make up for the gender difference that inhibit women 
 Cornell, Drucilla, and Catharine A. MacKinnon. "Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and 31
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 Stein, Laura. “Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of 32
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to participate fully in the civic sphere. Privacy is inherently a negative right that 
embodies the private/public dichotomy that works to subordinate the feminine into the 
private sphere. Yet, feminists have argued that its positive interpretation “would authorize 
the government not simply to refrain from interfering with personhood, but also to act 
when action is required to ensure personhood.”  I draw on this concept to showcase the 33
strengths and limitations of both the equality and privacy doctrine though a positive and 
negative rights framework.  
 In conclusion, feminist critique of concepts such as privacy and equality add 
nuance to our understanding of how doctrines work to subordinate women in a variety of 
ways. The upholding of a private/public dichotomy is essential for a patriarchy in a 
liberal political tradition. It operates by limiting women to the private sphere to sustain a 
male norm in civic life. On a rights level, this limits the equality of women because it 
robs them of their autonomy. Philosophically, autonomy is tied to both notions of equality 
and privacy, yet there is no explicit “right to” autonomy in our constitution. However, we 
do know that as a consequence of the public/private tension, female autonomy is 
understood and treated very differently than male autonomy. Currently, male autonomy 
allows men to move more freely between civic and public life, while women are confined 
to sustaining ideals of home life and motherhood. I will now turn to history to showcase 
how early feminist theory handled severe limitations of women in the civic sphere.  
Stein, Laura (1993)33
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Chapter 2: Equality As Sameness: Gender Discrimination Case Law 
———————————————————————————————————— 
 The American constitution guarantees equal protection under the law. In the 
modern understanding, this means that laws cannot treat an individual differently or deny 
them protection because of their race, gender, or sexuality, absent sufficient justification. 
But this was not always the case, and the ideal is not that simple to apply. Each of the 
categories of discrimination has a case history in which it had to be established that 
differential treatment of a group because of their race, gender, or sexual orientation must 
survive heightened scrutiny to further a state interest. In this analysis, these categories 
receive particular protection under the law. 
 An examination of sex discrimination case law shows the concept of equality the 
Court has been building off of since the feminist movement in the 1960s. The framework 
these feminists were working with was a concept of “equal treatment” that was informed 
by stereotypes of femininity that were articulated to protect women, but in actuality 
limited them. Holding a job and raising children at the same time was almost impossible, 
as women’s ability to be anything but mothers was highly suspect by cultural norms. The 
Court was fully operating on cultural expectations of women at the time, rather than 
equal treatment.  
 While the NAACP was articulating to the Court how laws which treated African 
Americans differently were deserving of strict scrutiny, laws that treated women 
differently than men were not questioned yet. Litigators challenging sex discrimination 
had the task of convincing the Court that women were not inherently different than men, 
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just like African Americans were not inherently different than white people. Thus, any 
limitations put on women were arbitrary and deserved a higher level of review from the 
court and a compelling state interest.  
 The initial approach of the liberal feminist movement was to focus legal 
arguments on strict equality. To do this, litigants denied that there was any difference 
between the sexes, and thus they should be treated alike. As a leader of this strategy, Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, through her founding of the ACLU’s Women’s Project, worked at 
convincing the Court that stereotypes of women were not a compelling state interest to 
limit women from experiencing full personhood under the law. This strategy was best at 
dismantling overt legal restrictions the law imposed on women and was called the 
assimilation approach.  She not only lived out this theory by being one of the first 34
female lawyers at the time, but she spearheaded caselaw that slowly expanded and 
presented this idea of equality for women before the Court. 
 At the time of Reed, Justice Ginsburg’s argument was radical. Explicitly informed 
by feminist theorist Simone de Beauvoir, Ginsburg began to bring feminist theory into the 
Supreme Court. Her first case was Reed v. Reed (1971), in which a Idaho state law 
defaulted to males over females when deciding who gets administrator privileges over an 
estate.  Sally Reed was separated from her husband and sued the state for sex 35
 Taub, N. and W. Williams, 1993. “Will Equality Require More Than Assimilation, 34
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discrimination when they gave her husband administrator rights over their previously 
joint owned estate. Ginsburg used this case to articulate a provision of due process that 
had never before been used to accommodate the different lived experiences between men 
and women. Behind this law was the assumption that women are not as capable as men to 
manage property. The Reed case provided an explicit example of discrimination that 
limited women in the civic sphere.  
 When Justice Ginsburg spoke to the Burger Court, she had to conceptualize a 
theory of equality that accommodated the Court’s narrow view of women. Women had 
been differentiated by the courts as a special kind of classification that needed special 
protections due to their weak nature. Muller v. Oregon (1908), and its accompanying 
Brandeis brief, legitimized a women’s domestic role in society through maximum labor 
laws that only applied to women.  In the words of the unanimous court: 36
  “That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions  
 place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is  
 especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are 
 not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time  
 on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon  
 the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical  
 well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to  
 preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”  37
 Documented in 1908, the Court thought of women as different from men, as 
delicate, as mothers, and as situated in the domestic sphere of law. These assumptions 
were rationalized as “women’s physical structure” and thus her propensity to have a 
passive nature that was deserving of protection and resulted in limitations on women in 
 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)36
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the civic sphere. Feminists criticized these laws as in place to “protect” this image of 
women and ensure the perpetuation of the tradition or belief that this was indeed the way 
that gender works.  This notion of equality as paternalistic put women in an extremely 38
limited position. In Reed, this view of women was relevant for the wife that wanted 
administrators rights over her estate, and was only denied them because of her gender. 
But for the Court at the time, women were mothers first, and everything else second. It 
was no wonder that Ginsburg and legal feminist scholars at the time conceptualized the 
fight for equality to directly combat these perverse stereotypes and limitations on women 
due to their “nature.”  Ginsburg called for equal treatment as sameness, stating in her 39
brief that: 
 “Although the legislator may distinguish between individuals on the basis of their  
 need or ability, it is presumptively impermissible to distinguish on the basis on an  
 unalterable identifying trait over which the individual has no control and for  
 which he or she should not be disadvantaged by the law. Legislative   
 discrimination grounded on sex, for purposes unrelated to any biological   
 difference between the sexes, ranks with legislative discrimination based on  
 race…and merits no greater judicial deference… Laws which disable women  
 from full participation in the political, business and economic areas are often  
 characterized as ‘protective’ and beneficial. Those same laws applied to racial or  
 ethnic minorities would readily be recognized as invidious and impermissible.  
 The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer  
 inspection, been revealed as a cage.”   40
 Ginsburg made the case that gender functioned similarly to race in that no tangible 
difference related to biology existed between men and women. Ginsburg succeeded in her 
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first step to achieve a higher level of judicial scrutiny for laws that treated the men and 
women differently with a rational basis review. It was a necessary first step to combat 
overt and explicit limitations on women. Reed was the first time the Court ruled that a 
law was unconstitutional for the sole reason of denying certain rights based on sex. Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the Court: “Regardless of their sex, 
persons within any one of the enumerated classes of that section are similarly situated 
with respect to that objective. By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who 
are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.”  41
 Ginsburg took the cue from the Court that they were willing to take up challenges  
to laws that treated the sexes differently. Inherent in this was the chance to argue to the 
Court that women’s roles were not limited to mothers, caretakers, or wives. Women were 
just as dynamic as men and deserved just as much protection and opportunity as men to 
live out their lives with autonomy and respect. This was the articulation of equality 
Justice Ginsburg aimed for when she argued Reed.  However, legal rhetoric that 42
assumed a male as the subject of law veiled the less overt, but just as harmful, instances 
of gender discrimination.  Reed was successful because it started the conversation with 43
the Court that some laws treated the sexes differently and this distinction was arbitrary. 
Yet the “equality” the Court developed was one of erasing difference between the genders 
rather than embracing them and dismantling their limitations. The language Justice 
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Burger used in his main opinion stemmed from a vision of equality that treated all cases 
alike, while not robustly accounting for the differences between the subjects. The Idaho 
law violated the Equal Protection Clause, because according to the litigant’s argument 
and the Court’s interpretation, when dealing with estate rights, men and women are 
similarly positioned to take on administrator rights. There is, then, no difference between 
them and the law should treat them as similar subjects, rather than defaulting to men. 
This version of equality pushes the narrative that so long as men and women are alike, 
the laws should not treat them differently. Yet how would the court account for situations 
in which the “sexual difference” was relevant to the position of women?  
 The legal development of treating men and women as similar subjects was 
furthered in Fronterio v. Richardson (1973), two years after Reed.  Sharon Fronterio was 44
not permitted to claim her husband as a dependent in order to receive social security 
benefits from the military benefit policy after serving in the army as a lieutenant. Again, 
we see how the stereotype of women being tied to the home and dependent on men was 
informing the law. The ACLU Women’s Project succeeded in convincing four Justices 
that a higher level of scrutiny should be applied to gender cases due to the salient and 
entrenched history of sex discrimination in American law. Justice Brennan recognized 
that “…statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously 
relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual 
capabilities of its individual members” and thus, these laws needed a higher level of 
review than just the rational basis that was employed in Reed. The narrative that men and 
 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)44
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women are the same and women should not be limited by the law persisted as litigants’ 
strategy and this concept of equality as sameness was carried through in further sex 
discrimination cases.   
 The logic that laws informed by arbitrary stereotypes of the genders should be 
subjected to a higher level of judicial review was further solidified in Craig v. Boren 
(1976).  The facts of the case seem almost arbitrary for the Supreme Court, but perhaps 45
the juvenile nature of the case showcased the unsophisticated reasoning behind laws that 
treat the genders differently. Craig, a male under twenty one years old, challenged an 
Oklahoma law that permitted eighteen year old women to buy beer but did not allow her 
male counterparts to do the same until he was twenty-one years-old. The Court agreed 
that under its Equal protection analysis of Frontiero that this law’s chosen means to 
furthering a state interest was poorly adapted to that end. In their opinion, Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and Blackmun articulated a standard of 
intermediate scrutiny, now a higher level, that had to be applied to laws that treated the 
genders differently.  
A. Feminist Criticisms of Assimilation/Denial of Difference Between the Sexes 
———————————————————————————————————— 
 While it was a success to convince the Court that differential treatment based on 
gender should be constitutionally suspect by eliminating gender difference from an 
analysis of equality, it still did not change the reality that women can have children while 
 Craig v. Boren (1976), 429 U.S. 190 (1976)45
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men cannot. The approach of formal equality was initially to deny any difference 
between the sexes. Consequently, there was no mention of reproduction in the arguments 
to the Court in Reed, Richardson, and Boren. This “difference as sameness” approach 
would later be criticized by feminist legal scholars such as Catharine Mackinnon who 
claim that difference as sameness perpetuates the innate masculinity in legal doctrine and 
does little to change the oppression of femininity.  46
 Feminist criticisms of this approach have warned that a robust and genuine 
representation of equal protection needs to account for women’s reproductive role as 
natural and not situated in the private sphere of liberal protection. A thread of feminist 
critique developed its search for equality to account for the ways women are biologically 
different, but do not default as subordinate to men. The goal was to show how the 
feminization of the home in a liberal system puts women down, constructed to the 
normative understanding that women are just the weaker sex. As Laura Stein and many 
liberal feminists developed, 
 “‘To have substantive equality between the sexes… the law must accommodate  
 women's particular reproductive role’ and without it, equality doctrine ‘may help  
 perpetuate the  separate spheres ideology, both because it can be interpreted as  
 accepting that women, as childbearers, are and will always be the primary   
 childrearers….Rather than achieving power for women generally, the minority of  
 MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.” Harvard University Press, 46
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 women who do operate in the public sphere  will, in order to succeed, necessarily  
 be co-opted into the preexisting male-defined value system.’”  47
The equality doctrine, at this point in case law, has fallen short of a robust concept 
required to directly challenge women’s oppression. The facts of Reed, Richardson, and 
Boren made these cases about women in civic life: managing estates, purchasing beer, 
and employment benefits. Yet, these cases allowed women into the public sphere as long 
as they were like men and lead to a one dimensional concept of equality that only worked 
for some women and “co-opted” them into a “preexisting male-defined system.” 
Materially, women have been let into the public sphere without the proper 
accommodations to make sure they have equal footing with their male counterparts. 
“Difference as sameness” only holds in situations in which women’s reproductive life is 
not glaringly at issue, or if women bend over backwards to hide it.  
 This thread of critique can also be understood as a positive and negative rights 
issue. The negative interpretation of the equal protection clause was utilized in gender 
discrimination case law. Reed, Richardson, and Boren resulted in a higher level of 
scrutiny for laws that discriminate the sexes without demanding any sort of affirmative 
protection to women in the civic sphere. According to MacKinnon, this is what resulted 
in women being allowed in the civic sphere as long as they suppressed their femininity 
and assimilated to the male run and defined public sphere. Theoretically, the feminine 
needed to remain tied to the private sphere to perpetuate the public/private dichotomy 
 Stein, Laura. "Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of 47
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that was essential for political liberalism. Gender discrimination case law did little to 
challenge this dichotomy and instead worked towards dismantling glaring limitations on 
women in civic life. The consequences of this case law materialized in the treatment of 
pregnant women in the law.  
B. Pregnancy Discrimination  
———————————————————————————————————— 
 The treatment of pregnancy as a disability shows the problematic 
conceptualization of the Equal Protection Clause the Court continued to develop. 
Feminist legal theory accounted for the “dilemmas of difference”, which happens when a 
decision encompasses assumptions about the genders and solidifies them as inevitable or 
unchangeable, when really it is just one point of view.  By not protecting women’s 48
biological differences in “equal treatment”, it became the unstated norm that people 
working should not become pregnant. Male norms informed laws, and thus “employment 
policies concerning pregnancy are notorious examples warranting separate mention” for 
the limited construct of equality the Court developed.  The treatment of pregnant women 49
shows the consequences of the difference as sameness approach. While the sameness 
argument made theoretical sense, it made little material sense for the lives of actual 
women and men trying to practice autonomy in their lives. A encyclopedia of feminist 
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legal scholarship synthesizes that many feminists studying law were outraged by the 
treatment of pregnant women. It became a great example of the unwavering patriarchal 
institutions that still exist, despite gender discrimination case law, that controls the bodies 
of women:  
 “Men and women were being treated the same: neither received pregnancy  
 benefits. So men did not receive any benefits that women did not receive. And  
 women did not receive any benefits that men did not receive. The logical   
 implication was that requiring a benefits program to include pregnancy benefits  
 for women would entitle them not to equal rights, but to special rights; not to  
 equal treatment but to special treatment… Feminists were stunned by this   
 argument—after all, only women can become pregnant.”  50
Attitudes towards pregnant bodies, that they don't belong in the civil sphere, denied 
women accommodations for their difference and instead pushed them to hide pregnancy 
or deal with the experience themselves. This was seen as the consequence of women 
trying to be like men and thus, deserving of equal treatment. “Special rights” or 
accommodations for sexual difference became shameful. Yet, this stood in stark contrast 
to the liberation of women. It was a the “maternal function” of women that  “formed the 
basis of a dual system of law” and perpetuated the feminization of the privacy doctrine.  51
Equality for women was not robust without the accommodation of women’s biological 
ability to have children. Given the assumption that women’s primary role in society was 
to be mothers, pregnant women in the workplace had no protection over their bodies and 
jobs once they became pregnant while employed. In General Electric v. Gilbert (1976), 
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the employers provided insurance to its workers that did not include disabilities from 
pregnancy. The Court had to decide if the exclusion of pregnancy violated Title VII. They 
reasoned that because the disability plan split the employers up into groups that included 
both sexes in it, there was no sex discrimination on the part of General Electric. With 
their ruling, the Court set the precedent that pregnancy was going to be treated like any 
other disability for insurance claims. Pregnant women in the workforce were not given 
any protection under the law despite the fact that it was only women who could become 
pregnant while working and thus it was not the same as a “disability” that could 
potentially affect the entire population with equal distribution. Classifying pregnancy as a 
general disability is clearly not representative of the realities in which women live their 
lives. While the opportunity to have a family and work at the same time may be possible 
in theory, the lack of protection of reproductive decisions excludes and limits women 
through their reproductive capabilities.  
Here lies the fork in the road from equal protection to privacy for the reproductive 
rights movement. Decision barring gender discrimination was rooted in the Equal 
Protection clause with no mention of reproduction, while Roe was established under the 
right to privacy and with no mention of equality between the sexes. This fracture of the 
equality/privacy arguments lead the Court to make interpretations in what the equal 
treatment of women in society would entail. It was the efforts of scholars such as 
Ginsburg at the time to advance equality through litigation and the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA). The ERA was advocated for predominantly by the group National 
Organization for Women. The amendment was proposed as such in 1972 in Congress: 
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“Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex.”  52
 The amendment was defeated in 1982, but its proposal fueled the dialogue around 
the treatment of women in the law. Before intermediate scrutiny was won in Boren, 
Ginsburg saw the ERA as another catalyst for the Court to take on sex discrimination 
cases “in earnest” and that it would help litigators flag which State laws treat the sexes 
differently and thus needed suspect review.  The belief behind the legal strategy 53
Ginsburg and the ACLU utilized was that dismantling gender stereotypes would convince 
the Court to adopt a higher level of scrutiny for gendered laws. Theoretically, then, 
equality rested on the concept that there was no legitimate difference between the ability 
of the sexes to be dynamic individuals. Consequently then, Justice Ginsburg began to 
pick away at the assumptions the Court had that made women unequal to and more 
limited than men on a case by case basis. Labor laws, child custody laws, social security 
laws, and liquor laws were all used to show the arbitrary differential treatment women 
endured that were ultimately dangerous and thus deserving of a higher level of scrutiny. 
While Justice Ginsburg made major advancements for women and gender equality, 
abortion was not a part of the equality argument that was developed for the Court. Thus, 
to the Court, women’s reproductive abilities was left out of the logic that women should 
not limited by their ability to have children. 
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 At the time of Gilbert, the general attitudes towards disabled people was one of 
paternalistic pity that assumed people with disabilities were  “not expected to lead normal 
lives.”  This same logic was present towards women when the Court made its decision 54
in Gilbert. Instead of providing accommodations for pregnant women to allow them to 
work and raise a family at the same time, any barrier removal for women was treated as a 
privilege rather than a right. This was due in part to the negative right side of equality that 
became the doctrine for equal protection. Women’s control over their reproductive lives is 
an unmet condition for equality as long as this logic persists. While the development for 
disability rights adopted the belief that “…people with disabilities are oppressed more by 
society than by their disabilities,”  and thus any law that restricts a disabled person was 55
discrimination, women have not achieved this logic as a category.  The consequence was 
“the way government chooses to aid people with disabilities… ‘It looks as though the 
federal government prefers to keep disabled people down than help them up.’”  56
Feminists argue the same can be noted about the legal treatment of women and how every 
step forward only worked to uphold institutional limitations on the feminine. As Wendy 
Williams writes:  
 “Due process and equal protection doctrines produce distinctly different   
 constraints and consequences. Because the two doctrines focus on different  
 aspects of the reproductive phenomenon—the one on protecting the liberty to  
 make certain reproductive choices free of state intervention, the other on   
 whether the state has treated the sexes evenhandedly…in all contacts in which  
 Burke, Thomas F. “Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights: The Battle Over Litigation in     54
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 pregnancy is regulated, a concern for the equality as well as the liberty   
 implication of the regulation is warranted.”  57
Williams’ analysis shows one of the many ways the application of equality was 
insufficient to capture the totality of what equal protection for women would really look 
like. The negative interpretations of privacy and equality boundaries in reproductive 
choice cases allowed for the Court’s biases to determine how women’s control over their 
bodily decisions were made. 
C. Equality as a Negative Right  
———————————————————————————————————— 
 So far, I have shown how the utility of an equality argument for gender 
discrimination resulted in a narrow view of womanhood that works to default women into 
the private sphere as mothers. The negative rights use of equality created a uphill battle 
for women trying to engage in civic life. Women’s admission into civic life is conditional: 
as long as they assimilate to the male defined norms, they can stay. But the moment 
women disrupt this order, they are mistreated and not protected fully by the law. 
Pregnancy discrimination proves the best example of this limitation on women. Due to 
male norms, maternal functions are not welcome in the work force and the law was not 
interpenetrated to adequately protect women’s full personhood inside and outside the 
home. Thus, reproductive rights case law and its development is crucial for the concept of 
female autonomy and its fluidity between the spheres. An affirmative protection of 
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female reproductive abilities has the potential to deliver a concept of autonomy for 
women that is just as robust and respected as the males. Jill Lepore has suggested that an 
equality argument would work towards this ideal for abortion cases and could help 
litigants argue for more healthcare protection for women. Yet as I have showcased, the 
equality argument as applied to women so far, has not delivered its full potential. But to 
access the legitimacy of the argument for equality, we first need to understand how 
privacy has been developed and applied for reproductive rights cases.  
 Reproductive choice jurisprudence has been developed as a freedom from 
government interference in a choice, rather than an affirmative provision of them. The 
treatment of pregnant women is crucial to the understanding of the consequences of not 
having a dynamic positive concept of equality. Arguing reproductive choice doctrine 
under a privacy argument may have been the best available tool for litigators at the time, 
but it has developed into a underwhelming and misguided delivery of both privacy and 
equality that has held women back from the public sphere and thwarted development of 
their full potential.  
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Chapter 3: Privacy and Reproductive Rights 
———————————————————————————————————— 
Reproductive rights has developed out of a right to privacy. The privacy 
framework, in its broadest summary, has made the Court revisit and rebalance the state 
interest to protect fetal rights versus a woman’s protected sphere of privacy. The Court, 
through reproductive rights case law, has battled with exactly what this intangible sphere 
of privacy includes in due process required from the state. In general, one approach is to 
ask for restraint from the state to not interfere with individual autonomy and decision 
making. The other asks for the guarantee that each individual has the same ability to 
make autonomous decisions for themselves. One interpretation sanctions the private 
sphere of society and the other calls into question the distribution of power in the public 
sphere that inherently affects how individuals make personal choices. If privacy is on a 
spectrum of requiring intervention from the state on one end and asking for space from 
the state on the other, reproductive rights has gone further on the negative end. There 
have been moments where the position of women in society has been acknowledged by 
the Court, but the laws and balancing tests out of this case history ultimately leave the 
distribution of power and the oppression of women unchallenged.  
 In the 1960s in Connecticut, contraception was not completely legalized. Paul and 
Pauline Poe, a traditional married couple, were seeking contraception due to Pauline’s 
serious health concerns. The majority of the Court ruled in Poe v. Ullman (1961) that the 
plaintiffs lacked any sort of reason to challenge the law, since it was not enforced.  One 58
 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)58
 39
of the dissenters of the Court that day was Justice John Marshall Harlan. In his separate 
opinion, Justice Harlan wrote about an expanded view of liberty and an early articulation 
of a right to privacy that later informed Justice William Douglas’s opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965).  Justice Harlan viewed due process, or protection under the law, as a 59
"rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial 
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.”  Justice Harlan saw no reason why the 60
state of Connecticut should make a law to prohibit couples from buying contraception. 
The wording of “arbitrary impositions” and “purposeless restraints” was later developed 
into a compelling state interest. Without one, the government could not infringe on the 
freedom protected by Justice Harlan’s expanded interpretation of due process.  
 Privacy was a vague idea, and for a while the Court grappled with exactly how 
much it would protect. A slippery slope argument was that privacy doctrine could 
eventually protect all of society’s greatest “sins” and all social order would be backwards. 
Or in other words, there was a fear that the status quo would be disrupted if more 
autonomy was accessible for all citizens under the constitution. To ease this critique, 
Justice Harlan kept the concept of privacy nuanced and downplayed it. In Poe, Justice 
Harlan first assured that the right to privacy “is not an absolute. Thus, I would not suggest 
that adultery, homosexuality, fortification and incest are immune from criminal inquiry, 
however privately practiced.” However as Justice Harlan was trying to establish the 
boarders of privacy, he made a specific note of the kind of relationship he thought was 
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especially deserving of sanction and privacy from the state, namely the relationship of 
marriage. Justice Harlan wrote that "the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an 
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage,” and thus must enjoy 
protection from state interference.  Marriage, he continued, was “an institution which the 61
State must not only allow, but which always and in every age has fostered and protected. 
It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extramarital sexuality 
altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a 
marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the 
criminal law and the details of that intimacy.”  For Harlan, privacy bolstered the value of 62
marriage. Poe was one vote shy of overruling the Connecticut 1879 law. Harlan's dissent 
and the Court’s ruling that the law lacked a way to challenge it paved the way to 
legalizing a right to privacy.  
 It is important to note the absolutes that Justice Harlan, and eventually the Court, 
recognized in whatever it was that privacy meant to them at the time. It was first 
articulated to protect a woman and her husband’s joint liberty through the legitimacy of 
the institution that marriage was. Female autonomy, as it is understood and protected 
today, was founded on her link to her husband and through the legitimacy of marriage. 
How far has privacy doctrine really come from habitualizing and practicing this way of 
thinking? This understanding of privacy was made law in Griswold. After Poe, 
reproductive rights litigants took the ruling as a green light to start opening up women’s 
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clinics that could give women access to contraception. One of these clinics was then shut 
down and criminalized under the same Connecticut law. Forced to reexamine the law, the 
Justices established a right to privacy when Justice Douglas wrote that there are 
“penumbras” in the Bill of Rights that create “zones of privacy” and this protected a 
married couples decision to use contraception or not.  Again, the privacy of the husband 63
and wife as a unit was seen as protected from the State. The origins of female autonomy 
over the decision to have children or not was seen as a family decision made in joint with 
the male counterpart, rather than a choice the women is protected to make herself. 
Marriage and the male counterpart was essential for the Court’s first understanding of 
privacy over sexual decisions. However salient this conservative way of thinking was in 
the Court, it was challenged by litigants ten years later. 
A. The Legitimacy of a Right to Privacy 
———————————————————————————————————— 
 The next step the Court made in developing the right to privacy was to emphasize 
the protection individuals have from the State. In Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), the Court 
overturned a Massachusetts law criminalizing the use of contraception by unmarried 
couples. The Court’s argument relied in part on the Equal Protection Clause, noting the 
differential treatment between married and unmarried couples. Justice Willian J. Brennan 
emphasized that the right to privacy is expansive enough to encompass just the 
individuals’ protection from state intrusion. He wrote:  
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)63
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 “whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the  
 rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike. If under   
 Griswold the distribution of  contraceptives to married persons cannot be   
 prohibited, a ban on distribution to  unmarried person would be equally   
 permissible...If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the   
 individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion  
 into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
 beget a child.”   64
This expanded interpretation for what the right to privacy entails carried the Court to the 
landmark decision of Roe v. Wade (1973). The Justices were able to recognize the value 
of individualized privacy through the priming of legitimizing private sexual decisions 
married and heterosexual couples make as one. Roe was an attempt to extend this right to 
the individual, including specifically the female and her body.  
 In the facts of Roe, Texas, like most states at the time, outlawed abortion except to 
save a woman’s life. This view of abortion gave no protection to female autonomy over 
the decision process. In the pre-Roe world, only a severe medical condition determined 
by a doctor could constitute an ability to exercise enough control over a pregnancy to 
make the choice to terminate. In a 7-2 decision, the Court honored the development of the 
role of privacy already articulated in the contraception cases.  If the focus on liberty was 
expansive enough to protect a woman’s decision to use contraception, then it was 
expansive enough to protect a woman’s decision to have a child or not, even after the 
pregnancy was already started.  
 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)64
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 The Court drew on Griswold and ruled in Roe that the “concept of personal 
‘liberty’ embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; or in personal, 
marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its 
penumbras…” establishes the right for a women to terminate her pregnancy.  This 65
decision honored the concept of privacy originated in Poe, emphasizing the “right to be 
left alone” from the state. At the time, it was not surprising that litigants on the pro-choice 
side chose to pursue the privacy argument. As a widely accepted logic, “Privacy was 
compatible with a legal tradition of non-interference in marriage; a tradition that 
buttresses the conservative idea that the personal is separate from the political, and that 
the larger social structure has no impact on private, individual choice. The privacy 
framework assumes that society bears no affirmative responsibility for individual choice 
or action.”  Herein lies the problem of the Court’s interpretation of privacy. Even though 66
the movement as a whole was working towards and envisioning a concept of privacy that 
could hold the State accountable to the realities women faced when making reproductive 
decisions, the Court clung to the conservative and “hands off” way of treating sexual 
decision making as the basis for this protection from state interference in an individual’s 
personal decision making. 
 Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, (1973)65
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B. The Feminist Critique of Roe  
———————————————————————————————————— 
 The Roe decision has been subject to intense scrutiny, including among feminist 
legal scholars.  While the immediate backlash was robust, it is ongoing even though 67
most feminist scholarship has turned to a focus on identity politics.  Constitutional 68
scholar Jack M. Balkin started a dialogue among other legal scholars in a debate about 
the legal basis of Roe. The criticisms generated are filled with insightful critiques and 
interpretations of the law, many of which derive from legal theory not tapped into by the 
Court.  
 One such theorist is Reva B. Siegel, a feminist legal scholar and expert in 
Constitutional law. Siegel's scholarship is particularly insightful here, as her work 
provides a way to discuss both privacy and equality doctrine inherent in abortion case 
law. In her mock judicial opinion of Roe, Siegel advocates for the equality argument as 
the most compelling basis for a right to an abortion, rather than the privacy argument. Her 
argument derives from the concept of equality developed out of sex discrimination cases. 
In her view, abortion regulations should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, as “abortion 
restrictions are deeply tied to the stereotypical views about the sexes and about the duties 
of women.”  Siegel draws on the concept of equality that the Court has available now. 69
She notes that “as we have come to understand it, the equal citizenship principle 
 Balkin, Jack M. "What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said." The Nation’s Top Legal Experts 67
Rewrite America’s Most Controversial decision (2005).
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embodied in the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments prohibits state action premised 
on traditional assumptions about the sexes that perpetuates second-class citizenship for 
women.” Siegel cites Reed to illustrate that a proper use of equal protection could extend 
to abortion regulations, as they perpetuate stereotypes of women and the Court has a 
commitment to stopping this discrimination. She continues by making the point that 
women are not different citizens than men just because they can have children.  
 Siegel draws on the negative concept of equality, or “equality as sameness” 
principle that filled earlier feminist interpretation of gender discrimination. While I agree 
with Siegel’s interpretation of what argument can be made given the equality doctrine in 
the Court currently, I am skeptical that even this legal basis of Roe would not garner any 
robust version of equality for women.  Siegel’s equality argument would not require the 
state to ensure that stereotypes of women do not occur, rather that abortions cannot be 
restricted if they coerce a women into pregnancy. However, this interpretation lacks any 
sort of intersectional concerns on the different experiences of women. For marginalized 
women, reproductive justice may require combating sterilization practices rather than 
abortion restrictions.   Reproductive justice is not just about securing abortion, but about 70
creating institutions that allow women to author their own lives. I fear that Siegel’s utility 
of equality focuses too much on citizenship and her view of what makes citizenship equal 
for women, rather than on developing female autonomy. While adopting a strict scrutiny 
review for abortion laws may lead to less restrictive laws, I am skeptical that this 
application of equality would change the focus of the Court’s rhetoric. Siegel’s argument 
 Dean Spade, "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 70
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still gives the state the ability to judge and regulate “good citizen bodies (those that are 
married, heterosexual, reproductive, and white)” and “noncitizen bodies 
(nonheterosexual, nonreproductive, engaging in sex for pleasure, and nonwhite).”  An 71
emphasis on negative equality still treats women as the same as men, without embracing 
feminine experiences as different yet no worse and no better. Another strain of feminist 
critique of Roe stems from Justice Ginsberg herself.     72
 In 2013, Justice Ginsburg shared her critique of Roe, stating that as well as not 
using a gradual policy shift, the litigation approach wasn't women centered.  How could 73
it be, when the rhetoric inside and outside the Court was largely focused on fetal rights 
and the anxieties of the New Right?  Justice Ginsburg advocates for a new lens to the 74
legal analysis for abortion cases—one that considers the woman’s position as the vocal 
point. Siegel may envision this change to come from the utility of the equality doctrine 
rather than the privacy doctrine. However, while Siegel’s approach is radical in that it 
advocates for a new legal basis of Roe, it still utilizes the same logic behind the equality 
doctrine that has not produced effective equality for women. Legal scholarship has 
criticized the litigants behind reproductive rights for falling into the trap of staying too 
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close to the legal frameworks in the Court. Being afraid to ask for more has yielded little 
change and an illegitimately of the reproductive rights movement for some:  
 “Central to the lessons one draws from...abortion...is that framing of the legal  
 arguments tendered before the Court was important to the ultimate resolution of  
 the issues. In both cases, initial “liberal” victories were forged and then lost, in  
 significant part, because their defenders doggedly clung to their understanding of  
 the Court's logic. This fatally constrained their ability to shift argumentational  
 grounds when those victories came under threat. This was called the “tyranny  
 of absolutes,” the notion that legal arguments, once seemingly won, are absolute  
 and defensible only on those grounds. Without the argumentational flexibility to  
 adapt to new conditions, the tyranny of absolutes lead abolitionists and pro-choice 
 advocates to dig their own doctrinal graves by ignoring alternative arguments that  
 might have saved the underlying goals their initial victories were intended to  
 achieve and protect.”  75
It is important to note that Epstein and Kobylka add to the scholarship on legal change by 
showing that the courts can be a place for the status quo to prevail and reiterate much of 
the same concepts at its origin. Feminist scholarship would add that this nature continues 
the gendered treatment of the law. When Roe was decided, it was inevitable that any 
doctrine used would be coming from a gendered place. Scholarship has show that 
changing the legal discourse within the courts is possible and if not attempted, the same 
norms will continue to be reinstated without a doubt. For women and abortion rights, this 
has meant a history of state interference on women’s autonomy and therefore women 
equality.  
 Epstein, Lee. The Supreme Court and Legal Change: Abortion and the Death Penalty. Univ of 75
North Carolina Press, 1992. 311.
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C. Limits of Privacy 
———————————————————————————————————— 
 The trimester framework the Court outlined later in Roe perpetuated a logic of 
privacy that limited a woman’s ability to participate fully in society because of her 
reproductive abilities. The Court honors the individual’s right to be left alone in-so-far as 
the state cannot arbitrarily stop a woman from ending a pregnancy. While their ruling 
protects women from some groundless limitations on reproductive health decisions, the 
logic does not ensure the lifting of barriers for women. Under privacy, the state does not 
have to even the playing field for women when they are pregnant or trying not to be. Here 
we see it as a negative right; privacy does not require active protection. Rather, it is a off-
hands approach to leaving women alone to make their decisions. In Roe, the trimester 
framework was the test the Justices set up to guide state’s interference in the privacy of a 
woman and her childbearing decisions. Later, I will discuss how the transition from the 
trimester framework to a undue burden analysis allowed for interpretations of female 
autonomy that was so focused on fetal life that it took away from the practical right to an 
abortion.  
 After the Court established the right to an abortion, they outlined a balancing test 
to accommodate any state interest in protecting the well-being of the fetus. Called the 
trimester rule, the Court outlined the following scale of protection a woman could expect 
during her pregnancy: 
 “First trimester: the decision is between a woman and her physician  
 Second trimester: the states can “regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are  
 reasonably related to maternal health.” 
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 Third trimester: “the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human  
 life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except when it is  
 necessary...for the preservation or health of the mother…”  76
At the time, this standard was considered medically driven and it ensured the autonomy 
of the woman in the first trimester. This unregulated autonomy, guaranteed in the first 
trimester at least, was later challenged in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and 
replaced with the “undue burden” standard. As defined by the Supreme Court, a undue 
burden analysis claims that a “law is invalid if its purpose or effect is to place substantial 
obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”  77
But to see how the Court got to this analysis, it is important to see the immediate 
regression the Court took to the individual liberty supposedly guaranteed to women after 
its decision in Roe.  
 The immediate backlash of Roe established a well practiced routine the State and 
pro-choice litigators have been adding to ever since the decision in 1973. States push the 
boundary of how much they can restrict abortion access, while reproductive rights 
litigators try to defend and reiterate the privacy right of all women. Increasingly, the 
morality of protecting a fetus has taken precedent over the protected privacy of women. 
Already on weak footing, the logic in Roe did not translate into equality for women 
through a control over their reproductive lives. Harris v. McRae (1980)  is the most 78
blatant departure from any logic towards a robust or positive rights concept of female 
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equality. In Harris, Justice Stewart wrote for the majority opinion that “although 
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of 
choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigence falls in the latter 
category.”  Again we see privacy being interpreted as a negative right. The Court did not 79
require state funding for abortion because of the “hands-off” approach to privacy it had 
drawn on in privacy doctrine. While the Court allowed abortion, the right to access it was 
not seen or treated as a necessary component of women’s freedom. Instead, it was 
something in which the Court tried to refrain from interfering in. When Justice Stewart 
wrote that “indigence” was something a women created for herself, it showcased the 
limited understanding the Court had on discrimination against women, especially 
unprivileged women. Without state funding for abortion, access to already limited 
reproductive health care was only possible for women who were able to travel and pay 
for services. This reality was and is devastating for a movement that was first started in 
the 1960’s for “…the woman of color who does not know she can space her children, 
who cannot afford to go to a private doctor, who is being discriminated against by the 
Connecticut law.”  Estelle Griswold spoke those words when she first started her 80
crusade for reproductive justice for Planned Parenthood in the 1960s. Another activist, 
Lee Buxon said that the problem “all adds up to the rich getting contraceptives and the 
poor getting children.”  81
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 Harris showcased that the Court did not understand abortion from a positive 
rights framework or feminist equality approach. Abortion was not valued as a necessity 
that needed to be made available for women, but rather something it wanted little 
involvement in. The fear behind granting women comprehensive sexual health care is 
really a fear of disrupting the status quo. Only certain women are able to access the 
resources to make a fully autonomous decision over when to have a family or not. The 
scarcity of this freedom makes female autonomy or ability to control almost shameful. 
Perhaps this is due to an interest in unborn life, but also because of the underlying 
assumption that women are solely meant to be mothers and do not have full autonomy as 
individuals. Rhonda Coplan writes that “The explosive response to Roe attests to the 
deeply radical nature of the demand, first by feminists and then by lesbians and gays, for 
a power so fundamental in our traditional liberal constitutional scheme as control over 
one’s body.”  Putting aside the gay rights movement for now, abortion was at its core a 82
movement asking for women’s equality, even though the legal doctrine did not reflect 
that. On the ground, women and doctors were organizing services, campaigns, and 
trainings to do everything they could to protect a woman’s power over her reproductive 
health. From sexual education to abortion access, the reproductive rights movement, 
especially after the shock of Webster, strove to be an inclusive feminist movement 
 Copelon, Rhonda. "From Privacy to Autonomy: The Conditions for Sexual and Reproductive 82
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focused on individual equality, rather than “privacy.”  However, these intentions, no 83
matter how thought out and articulate they were, got lost in the legal logic.  
 Why was this so? David Garrow invites the nuance that “Rather than simply 
viewing the women’s ‘crusade against abortion’ as manifesting as a primary concern for 
fetuses, their activism should instead be seen as a ‘symbolic defense of traditional 
conceptions of morality.’” The attitudes of the Pro-Life movement were shown to be 
more than they let on in their legal arguments. Garrow writes that: 
 “‘There exists beneath the surface in young pro-life groups a deeply rooted  
 respect and admiration of the traditional women and the glories of motherhood.  
 This is accompanied  by a corresponding disrespect for and hatred of the modern  
 women as depicted by the feminist movement.’ For many  right-to-lifers, this  
 commentator recounted, the abortion crusade was essentially a ‘means to an end,’  
 for it was a highly viable way of ‘fighting the anti-family and animi-traditional  
 image that abortion is seen to promote.’ A less sympathetic professor made the  
 same point more bluntly: ‘the meanings resonating from abortion politics have  
 more to do with compulsory heterosexuality, family structure, the  relationship  
 between men and women and parents and children, and women’s employment,  
 than they do with the fetus.’”  84
These motivations contrasted to the actual legal arguments preoccupying the Court, 
showing an unfocused reasoning of the rights that were at stake for women in the next 
abortion rights cases. If the pro-life movement was really there to keep traditional 
femininity alive in the laws, then the focus on privacy and state interest almost seemed 
off-base. The necessary conversation was on stereotypes and how limitations were 
Fried, Marlene Gerber. “From Abortion to Reproductive Freedom: Transforming a Movement.” 83
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safeguarded by abortion regulations and violated women’s equal standing in society. 
However, the Court was caught up in a very different logic.  
 The next series of cases dealt with states’ regulations limiting abortion access. In 
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Care, (1983) the Court was asked 
to determine the constitutionality of a Ohio law that had a hospital requirement for 
abortion, a minor consent requirement, an information requirement, a 24-hour waiting 
period, and a disposal requirement. The Court struck down these provisions as a 
departure from the trimester framework and ruled that Ohio lacked a compelling interest 
for these limitations on women’s access to abortion services. Although the decision was 
good news for pro-choice litigators at the time, Justice O’Connor’s dissent began the 
debate over changing the balancing test the Court would use to protect female liberty. 
While the Akron decision could be interpreted to focus on the position of the woman to 
make a free choice, Justice O’Connor attempted to turn the focus to the viability of the 
fetus and the developing state interest in protecting viable life in light of a fast changing 
medical world. This shift would propel the discussion away from a woman-centered 
rhetoric for abortion.  
 In Akron, Justice O’Connor’s dissent urged the Court to adopt a new framework 
for determining the legality of abortion laws. She advocated to get rid of the trimester 
framework because she thought the Roe standard was “…on a collision course with itself. 
As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State 
may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth. 
As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, 
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the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.”  Her logic stems not 85
from the value of protecting female autonomy, but from protecting any life that could live 
outside the womb and how the Court should legally balance a fetal right to life with a 
women’s right to privacy. Justice O’Connor was concerned that the courts will have to 
speculate about what was “accepted medical practice” at any point in time, rather than 
supporting their decisions on legal doctrine.  To remedy this, Justice O’Connor outlined 86
an “undue burden” standard for the first time in her Akron dissent. Her focus was on the 
state’s role: “Roe is intended to protect against state action ‘drastically limiting the 
availability and safety of the desired service’…”  The Court eventually adopted this 87
standard in Casey after several more battles of state interest and privacy rights in 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians (1986) and Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services (1989).  
 In Thornbourgh, the Court evaluated a Pennsylvania state law that required 
informed printed consent from the woman, an extensive warning of risks of an abortion, 
certain reporting procedures of abortion by the provider, the use of specific medical 
techniques after viability, and the presence of a second physician for post-viability cases. 
The Court struck down these requirements as provisions used to deter a women from 
having an abortion. Then three years later in Webster, the Court was asked again the same 
question of constitutionality for a Missouri law that restricted state funds and employees 
from performing or assisting with abortion. Further the restrictions imposed counseling 
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on abortion for women. While not so much different than the Pennsylvania law in 
Thornbourgh, the Court upheld the restrictions in Webster. Webster was written in a way 
that restricted public funding of abortion, encouraged adoption in place of abortion, and 
strengthened the influence of the State after twenty weeks gestation. The Court 
interpreted this to not break any standard set in Roe “as no affirmative right to the use of 
state aid for non-therapeutic abortions existed.”  The Court’s legal interpretation of the 88
restriction in Webster may have been justified to honor Roe, but the material effects of 
legislation that works to restrict abortion through a emphasis on fetal life had the same 
materialized limiting effect for women and their autonomy.  
 After Webster it was clear to many advocates and scholars of the reproductive 
rights movement that their strategy needed to change. The study of social movements is a 
study of multiple variables, many of which unknown and unmeasurable, interacting with 
each other to create “change”. While this paper is a study of the Court and legal doctrine, 
it is important to understand the rhetoric behind litigants of reproductive rights and the 
larger context in which they were working. As the pro-choice side did its work, so did the 
pro-life side. However, the pro-life side at the time of Webster, and building up to Casey, 
was hostile to women’s rights and any development of a positive right to privacy. 
Furthermore, the pro-life side had politics on its side with the election of President 
Ronald Reagan. The Reagan Justice Department worked to make abortion an entrenched 
political issue when they sent representatives into Court to fight strongly against it. 
During Akron and Thornburgh, it was “the first time since Roe that, pro-choice advocates 
 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 4090 (1989)88
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faced effective opposition from the national government instead of state attorneys with 
minimal interest or limited expertise in the subject of Supreme Court advocacy.”  89
Additionally, the replacement of Powell and Stewart with O’Connor and Kennedy opened 
up the Court for the infiltration of an anti-choice sentiment. 
 The decision in Webster was in part set up by a change in political and judicial 
environment. However, some scholars have argued that this hostility was not enough to 
disempower the legal advocates of reproductive rights. Instead, their challenge resulted in 
part from the legal strategy they decided to take. In Webster, the pro-choice side could 
have benefited from gauging Justice O’Connor’s position much more than it did. It was 
her approval and advocacy of the undue burden standard that lead to the constitutional 
gutting of a right to an abortion post Webster. In Webster, pro-choice litigants “used amici 
in much of the same way” it had in previous cases “to bring attention to the Court’s 
different perspectives on abortion and to fill in medical, psychological, policy, and 
women’s interests gaps left open in their essentially legalistic efforts.”  Legal scholars 90
Epstein and Kobylka argue that “Herein, through, lies the problem: given the obvious 
changes in the political and legal environments…pro-choice arguments and strategies 
should have changed as well.”  The reproductive rights movement was not oblivious to 91
their loss and failure of strategy. Within the movement, advocates were hard at work re-
thinking the best way to defend a right to an abortion and women’s rights in general.  
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 At this point, however, I do not want to downplay the hostility that was rampant 
then and still today towards a woman’s right to an abortion and all the societal 
implications that right has. As one feminist legal scholar reiterated: 
 “As Justice Blackmun warned in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the  
 new majority on the Supreme Court is chillingly hostile to ceding this power, for  
 its denial is a cornerstone of patriarchal power whether expressed in the   
 enslavement of African-American people, the reproductive servitude of women,  
 or the denial to gays and lesbians of the right to love. Given the need to stave off  
 further erosion in the Supreme Court as well as to secure these fundamental rights 
 in Congress and state courts and legislatures throughout the country, it is   
 important that we understand the limitations of these rights heretofore recognized  
 by the Court, in this case the right to privacy.”  92
Feminist critique pushes my analysis here to decipher the privacy and equality argument, 
keeping in mind that privacy has been used as a “cornerstone of patriarchal power” in the 
Court thus far. The gap in the rhetoric between fetal rights and a woman-centered 
approach to abortion is synonymous with upholding patriarchal power versus dismantling 
it. Justice Blackmun stated in Webster that “The simple truth is that Roe no longer 
survives…I rue the violence that has been done to the liberty and the equality of women. 
I rue the violence that has been done to the liberty and equality of women. I rue the 
violence that has been done to our legal fabric and to the integrity of this Court.”  There 93
was no commitment to a robust concept of equality for women in the decisions the 
Courts, both State and Federal, on the rulings on abortion. But this was due to the fact 
that the legal framing of abortion was not founded on a commitment to female autonomy, 
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but on a commitment to resisting arbitrary state intervention in personal life. There was 
room for interpretation to focus on women’s societal limitations in connection to 
abortion, but the fetal rights framework has won out regardless of these efforts.  
D.  Re-Emergence of an Equality Argument  
———————————————————————————————————— 
 Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) was a moment in which the Court was 
persuaded fiercely to honor the gender equality argument inherent in the right to an 
abortion that had been cast aside in the previous decisions of the Court.  Casey was an 94
attempt to legitimize to the Court that a woman’s affirmative control and protection of her 
own right to her body was key for women’s equality. In her oral argument to the Court, 
Kathryn Kolbert stated: 
 “Since this Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, a generation of American women  
 have come of age secure in the knowledge that the Constitution provides the  
 highest level of protection for their child-bearing decisions. This landmark  
 decision, which necessarily and logically flows from a century of this Court's  
 jurisprudence, not only protects rights of bodily integrity and autonomy, but  
 has enabled millions of women to participate fully and equally in    
 society...Government may not chip away at fundamental rights, nor make them  
 selectively available only to the most privileged women.”   95
Kolbert linked equality with privacy for women in her oral argument for Casey. Her 
argument that upholding Roe was not important for the sanctity of married life, but 
essential for women to be full individuals freed from state imposed gendered limitations, 
 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)94
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echoed Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s argument to the Court that such legalized stereotypes 
towards women amounted to discrimination. Kolbert additionally pointed out the flaw in 
Harris to construe abortion as a hands-off right that only created more inequality among 
women themselves, arguing that the State cannot make rights “selectively available only 
to the most privileged women.” The Casey decision was contentious in that it had a 
contradictory logic. Casey was stuck in the “double edged sword” of privacy that 
emerged after Webster. Rhonda Copelon, a reproductive rights activist, wrote after 
Webster that “There has emerged a sharp tension between two notions of privacy: the 
liberal idea of privacy as the negative and qualified right to be left alone...and the more 
radical ideal of privacy as the positive liberty of self-determination and an aspect of equal 
personhood. Both practically and theoretically, the privacy doctrine is double-edged, 
having within it the tendency to constrain as well as to expand reproductive rights.”  The 96
two sides of privacy, positive and negative, were two very different arguments to be made 
to the Court. One was about sexual liberation for those traditionally oppressed by social 
institutions, such as women and queer people, and the other was about protecting the 
right to be left alone. Both arguments would materialize to mean very different realities 
for how we understand autonomy in this country. In Casey, Kolbert tried to push the 
Court towards recognizing the more positive notes of privacy. It is important to note how 
much was against this argument. The “tyranny of absolutes” gave litigators something to 
hold onto in a hostile Court and political environment. But Casey showed that holding on 
 Copelon, Rhonda. "From Privacy to Autonomy: The Conditions for Sexual and Reproductive 96
Freedom." From Abortion to Reproductive Freedom: Transforming a Movement, ed. Marlene 
Gerber Fried (Boston: South End Press, 1990): 27-43.
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to off-beat arguments, even to appease the Court’s way of thinking, would not lead to 
material equality for women.  
 By continuing the privacy logic already established with the Court, Casey was a 
convoluted victory and defeat for abortion rights. On one hand, Casey reaffirmed Roe and 
its central holding. The Court echoed Kolbert’s argument when they acknowledged 
personal choice: “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own 
moral code.”  With these words, Justice O’Connor placed privacy and personal liberty 97
above any prescriptions of morality. However, the newly articulated undue burden 
standard to justify the state’s control over the female access to abortion services created a 
sliding scale that pushed the State closer and closer to controlling a women’s ability to 
make free reproductive decisions. The Court explained that the new standard will focus 
on the viability of the fetus. The majority opinion declared that: 
  “Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy  
 before  viability, it does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from taking  
 steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even in the   
 earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to  
 encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great  
 weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full  
 term, and that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted  
 children as well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to  
 raise the child herself.” 
On this premise, the Justices revisited the trimester framework and concluded  that “the 
trimester framework suffers from these basic flaws: in its formulation, it misconceives the 
nature of the pregnant woman's interest; and in practice, it undervalues the State's interest 
Garrow, David J. Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade. 97
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in potential life, as recognized in Roe.” From this, they adopted Justice O’Connor’s 
previously articulated “undue burden” standard. Essentially, the majority explained, 
 “a finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state  
 regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of  
 a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is  
 invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential  
 life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a  
 statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid  
 state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a  
 woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its   
 legitimate ends.” 
 The Court protected the state’s interest in potential life and in doing so, gave states a tool 
to further restrict the “zone” of privacy women had around their bodies. The undue 
burden standard was lenient enough to justify regulations such as 24-hour waiting periods 
and mandatory counseling as an effort to “inform the woman’s free choice”. The Court 
has revisited exactly how much a women’s privacy protected her right to an abortion, and 
almost every case the protection encompasses less and less. Yet, in some ways, Casey 
was a positive decision in that it reaffirmed Roe, though the integrity of the holding of 
Roe being about women’s rights was slipping away. Justice Harry Blackmun recognized 
this loss at the time of Casey and wrote in his partial concurrence that, 
  “a State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy also   
 implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality. State restrictions on  
 abortion compel women to continue pregnancies they otherwise might terminate.  
 By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts women's  
 bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the  
 pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care.”  
Essentially, the Court’s development of privacy ignored the impact on womens potential 
entry into the public sphere, instead burdening women with their private duties as child 
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bearers. Laws regarding women’s reproductive health viewed the continuation of 
pregnancy as the default for women and any other decision did not receive as much 
support or institutionalized protection or normalcy. Casey was a moment when it seemed 
as though at this point in the Courts development, all of the lines towards an equality 
argument were there for reproductive freedom. It just needed to be linked together, but 
the link was not recognized by the Court or the litigants.  
 Many feminist legal scholars have outlined the downsides the privacy argument 
can have for the position of women in society. The privacy argument has been used to 
maintain the status quo, or the subordination of women, through a protection of the 
private/domestic sphere. These critiques on privacy have centered on the implementation 
of a negative framework of privacy.  The feminist critique is that this hands-off approach 98
to government does not account for the fact that “choice cannot be fully free” when we 
live “in a world riddled by racism, sexism, homophobia, poverty, and exploitation.”  99
This concept of privacy does not account for the coded hierarchies in society that put 
bodily autonomy in reach for some women and out of reach for others. Further, the 
current utilized concept of privacy does not account for the fact that this distribution is 
systematic and cannot be solved on an individual basis. In short, there are very real 
material effects to the Court’s decisions on the value of women’s lives.  
 Stein, Laura . "Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of 98
Privacy and Equality." Minnesota Law Review 77.1153 (1993): n. pag. LexisNexis. Web. 1 Mar. 
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 Post-Roe and beginning with Harris, the constitutional retrenchment on a right to 
an abortion has systematically disadvantaged some women over others. In Harris, the 
Court ruled that state funding for abortion was not required. Because of this, the state can 
actively 
 “chose to favor the fetus over the woman…the consequences for women’s access  
 is profound. Hospitals are used by women who often have no alternative: poorer  
 women, women of color, rural women, as well as women needing late abortions.  
 Excluding abortions from any hospital with a public connection will marginalize  
 the practice of abortion, and threatens to remove it from the curriculum of medical 
 schools which  conduct their training in hospitals tangentially related to the  
 state.”  100
Webster and Casey reiterated this logic and remains the leading dynamic. This logic and 
limitation of a right to an abortion brings us to where we are now. Targeted Regulations 
of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws are introduced every year and in every state. In 
2016, nearly 400 anti-abortion bills were passed.  Although each bill has a different 101
method of limitation they all try to accomplish the same goal: to materially eliminate 
access to an abortion. 
 There have been two recent reproductive rights cases since 2012 that confirm the 
fears many reproductive rights advocates had post Casey—the constitutional right to an 
abortion is vulnerable to severe limitation. Although not dealing directly with the right to 
an abortion nor the equality or privacy doctrine, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) is 
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important to mention here.  The case involved a closely held for-profit corporation 102
owned by a Mennonite family who believed that some contraception covered by the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) was equivalent to an abortion. Because of this, they wished 
to opt-out of the contraception mandate of the ACA for their female employees as they 
believed this coverage violated their First Amendment rights as well as the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Again, the Court was asked to investigate if the belief 
that life begins at conception constitutes a compelling state interest to interfere with 
women’s bodily autonomy. The Court ruled in the favor of the Hahn Family and thus, the 
precedent was set that religious rights of employees trumps a women’s material ability to 
control her reproductive life.  
 Important in this case was Justice Ginsburg’s thirty five page dissent that she read 
from the bench. The argument Justice Ginsburg makes in her dissent is an appeal to 
women’s autonomy, and how this decision severely violates any concept of female 
individual autonomy. To begin her dissent, Justice Ginsburg drew attention to powerful 
words that the Court has previously regarded as law, that “The ability of women to 
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by 
their ability to control their reproductive lives.”  This quote speaks directly to the 103
female employee’s autonomy over her body and her health. To advance this claim even 
further into the relevant facts of the case at hand, Justice Ginsburg traced the logic behind 
the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). She began with Senator 
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S (2014)102
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)103
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Barbara Mikulski, who introduced the Women’s Health Amendment (WHA), which 
integrated women’s preventative health care services into the ACA. For this part of her 
argument, Justice Ginsburg cited senators who were involved in the passage of the WHA 
and different medical research groups that gave empirical evidence to the senators, such 
as a report from the Institute of Medicine (IOM). Once she illustrated the rationale behind 
why the Senators who drafted the ACA included women’s health concerns, Justice 
Ginsburg moved on to show that the application of  the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA) by the Court severely deprives women of the autonomy over her body that 
the ACA was very intentionally supposed to support.  
 Justice Ginsburg used amicus briefs to support her women’s autonomy argument. 
In the relevant facts of the case, the Justice had ample medical research to back up her 
claim on the specific importance of the kind of contraception to which the Hanhs 
objected to. Research groups such as the Guttmacher Institute have done extensive 
investigation into measuring the social, economic, and political effects of women’s 
reproductive health. Their amicus brief supports the Court with thousands of examples of 
how female health directly affects their ability to be equal citizens in our communities. 
But while the Guttmacher Institute investigates the material effects of comprehensive 
reproductive rights, it cannot change laws. Justice Ginsburg pulls this medical discourse 
into her legal analysis, giving medical research on women’s health a legitimate stake in 
legal decisions. In addition to the Guttmacher Institute, Justice Ginsburg cites the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Ovarian Cancer National 
Alliance, and the National Health Law Program. While all of these briefs have slightly 
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different angles of analysis, they all bolster Justice Ginsburg’s autonomy argument in a 
very similar way—they provide empirical medical, economic, and ethical research 
evidence that supports the role contraception plays in women’s lives.  
 Legal scholars have documented the social movement’s reaction to this dissent, 
recognizing that Justice Ginsburg was trying to put the female’s individual rights front 
and center to the Court and its considerations.  This effort was seen again two years 104
later in a case dealing head-on with abortion regulations.  
 In 2016, the Supreme Court heard the case of Whole Women’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt (2016), in which one such law in Texas was challenged for imposing an 
undue burden.     Planned Parenthood filed a amicus brief that extensively outlined the 105
impact shutting down clinics that didn't meet hospital standards would have on all Texas 
women. Means to travel, the flexibility of a work schedule, childcare arrangements, and 
overnight stay arrangements all directly burden women without the resources for these 
accommodations.  Justice Ginsburg directed her questions at oral arguments towards 106
the application of the undue burden standard. The Justice managed to direct counsel to 
showcase how this law was not only an “undue burden” on Texas women, but also played 
no role to advance their health at all.  
 Justice Ginsburg asked the first and last questions of the oral arguments. What 
was relevant in this case is how the oral arguments and the decision utilized the “undue 
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burden” standard and what concepts of equality and privacy they were drawing from. 
Justice Ginsburg pushed the Court in a clear direction. She wanted to determine the 
material effect the Texas law had on the autonomy of women.   
 Scott Keller, representing Texas, made the argument that the laws were for the 
health of the women. Immediately Justice Ginsburg pointed out the flaw in this argument. 
Keller was trying to downplay Justices Kagin, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg’s line of 
questioning about how many women lived an appropriate distance from a clinic. The 
evidence suggested that the majority of women living in Texas of reproductive age were 
located over 200 miles from a clinic, and this would only increase if the law would go up. 
However, Keller rebutted this ratio by suggesting that women could always go to a clinic 
in New Mexico that was near the border. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Texas has no 
jurisdiction over New Mexico’s facilities, so how could they protect the health of women 
with this law if the material effect was forcing women to go across state lines for 
reproductive health services? This suggested that the law was not advancing any interest 
on the women’s behalf, but only placing an undue burden on their ability to access 
abortion: 
“Justice Ginsburg: That’s—that’s off that you point to the New Mexico facility.  
New Mexico doesn’t have any surgical—ASC requirement, and it doesn't have any 
admitting requirement. 
So if your argument is right, then New Mexico is not an avail way out for Texas because 
Texas says to protect our women, we need these things. 
But send them off to Mexico—New Mexico— New Mexico where they don’t get it 
either. No admitting privileges, no ASC.  
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And that’s perfectly all right. Well, if that’s all right for the—the women in the El Paso 
area, why isn't it right for the rest of the women in Texas?”  107
This line of questioning utilizes the bare minimum of the undue burden standard to show 
that this law has a direct negative effect on the health of women, and no beneficial effect. 
Texas comes back to say that the standards it imposes will benefit the women who can 
access the clinics. But this is not enough for Justice Ginsburg. She urges the Court to 
interpret more along a positive right of women to access health care when she interprets 
the Casey standard to ask not only if there is a undue burden, but are any women actually 
helped by the legislation? 
“Justice Ginsburg: May I ask you one question? You earlier in your argument, you were 
quoting how many women are within a reasonable range of the clinic. But don’t we know 
from Casey that the focus must be on the ones who are burdened and not the ones who 
aren't burdened? There— there is— and the district court said this, you know, there is not 
a problem for women who have means to travel, that those women will have access to  
abortion, anyways. So—in Texas or out of Texas.  
So Casey is quite precise in this, when it’s talking about husbands and notifications. You 
don't look to all the women who are getting abortions. You look only to the—to the— the 
women from who this is a problem And so the only women we would be looking at is not 
all of the women who are—who live in Austin or in Dallas, but the women who have the 
problem who don't live near a clinic.  
Mr. Keller: Well— 
Justice Ginsburg: Isn't that the clear message of Casey…But this is about—what its about 
is that a women has a fundamental right to make this choice for herself. Thats what we 
sought as the starting premise. And then this is certainly about—Casey—Casey made that 
plain, that it—the focus is not he women, and it has to the on the segment of women who 
are affected.”  108
 Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. (2016) at page 37107
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Justice Sotomayor makes this point as well in the beginning of oral argument that Justice 
Ginsburg expanded on with her questions about the mileage and the intention behind the 
Casey standard and how it was interpreted by Texas: 
“Justice Sotomayor: I’m not talking about the doctrine. I’m talking about the question I 
asked, which is, according to you, the slightest health improvement is enough to impose 
on hundreds of through sands of women—-even assuming I accept your argument, which 
I don’t, necessarily, because it’s being challenged—but the slightest benefit it enough to 
burden the lives of a million women. That’s your point?”  109
 Subsequently, the lines of questioning were intended to focus on the women and 
not only the burden she encounters with this legislation, but the benefit it has on her 
autonomy and the “fundamental right to make this choice for herself”, as Ginsburg 
emphasized in her last question. The Whole Women’s Health case was a step towards 
drawing on a concept of privacy, protected with the undue burden standard, that requires 
more from the State. Ginsburg asks the Court to focus on the women who are 
disadvantaged to start and how this legislation affects their right to make decision 
themselves. Along this line of logic and utility of the privacy doctrine, there could be a 
argument made that the state needs to deliver this right by providing more 
accommodations to women who are not regarded as the “neutral” under the law. This 
would be a positive interpretation of privacy. Texas was treating the subject of the law as 
women who can already access abortion, when really the focus should be on the scope of 
autonomy guaranteed to all women and making sure it is leveled. This could mean the 
state putting more resources towards protecting the autonomy of women under an undue 
 Transcript of Oral Argument at page 40, Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 109
(2016) 
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burden standard. Indeed the Court did focus on the health of the women in their decision 
to outlaw the restrictions on clinics in Texas: 
 “We have found nothing in Texas’ record evidence that shows that, compared to  
 prior law (which required a “working arrangement” with a doctor with admitting  
 privileges), the new law advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting   
 women’s health. We add that, when directly asked at oral argument whether Texas 
 knew of a single instance in which the new requirement would have helped even  
 one woman obtain better treatment, Texas admitted that there was no evidence in  
 the record of such a case.”  110
By putting female autonomy as the focus of the “undue burden” analysis, Justice 
Ginsburg was taking a step towards a positive rights interpretation inherent in privacy. 
The positive side of privacy would ask for affirmative protection of female autonomy. In 
the context of reproductive rights, this would be more comprehensive and preventive 
health care and securement of abortion services. The reality right now is extremely far 
from this ideal, but the positive interpretation of a privacy right at least puts female 
autonomy as the main issue and perhaps can build a platform to talk about what 
protection women need from the state to be equal citizens. Additionally, it can be 
observed that a equality argument and positive rights interpretation of privacy asks for 
similar affirmative protection. The re-entrenchment of the private sphere and 
subordination of women results from the use of a negative concept of either the equality 
and privacy right. I will now turn to marriage equality case law to outline the lessons the 
reproductive rights movement can learn by using a equality argument as the movement’s 
legal basis. 
 Transcript of Oral Argument at page 37, Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 110
(2016) 
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Chapter 4: Same-Sex Marriage Case Law 
———————————————————————————————————— 
 The shared privacy and equality arguments of same-sex marriage and 
reproductive rights showcases the limitations of both doctrines for a feminist agenda. 
Early feminist legal scholars and activists for reproductive justice called for the unity of 
both movements, as they both dealt with themes of gender, sexuality, autonomy, and state 
protected sanctity. Mains and Poggi urged for a broader inclusiveness of reproductive 
rights after the Casey decision. The activities pointed out that, “Informed by feminism, 
reproductive freedom and gay liberation agendas aim for more than the acquisition of 
rights. Both movements call for a dismantling of traditional sex roles and for a radical 
change in social norms.”  Inherent in rights discourse is the criticism that when you 111
make an inclusionary argument before the Court, it comes with the cost of someone else 
being excluded. In law, there cannot in an “in” unless there is an “out”. Women of color 
feminism has made this criticism and called for inclusion ever since Simone De Beauvoir 
started documenting the oppression of white middle class women as representative of 
 “United We Are Going to Get Somewhere” by Mains, Shelly and Poggi, Stephanie in Fried, 111
Marlene Gerber. From abortion to reproductive freedom: Transforming a movement. South End 
Press, 1990.
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every female experience.  With rights discourse, there is an “othering" of the group that 112
doesn't get to be included in the new iteration of a call for change. The history of 
marriage equality informed the Courts concepts of privacy and equality that has 
consequences for the reproductive rights of women making a similar claim for abortion. 
  The roots of marriage equality can be traced back to the litigation strategies that 
first mobilized to get rid of sodomy laws. Sodomy laws date to colonial times as a effort 
to protect the sanctity of marriage.  The first court to ever define sodomy described 113
certain sexual acts out of marriage as “vile and detestable.”  In the 1940s, all non-114
traditional forms of intercourse were criminalized. When the American Law Institute 
(ALI) developed the Model Penal Code in the 1970s, its understanding of abortion and 
sodomy had a ripple effect on state criminal law statues.  Embedded in it was a liberal 115
notion that sodomy and abortion should not be criminalized. While only 14 states 
decriminalized abortion, states started dropping sodomy laws rapidly.  But this was not 116
of concern for homosexual couples who did not have the protection of marriage to engage 
in sexual acts in privacy. In fact, the states that did not adopt the blanket Model Penal 
Code explicitly re-wrote their sodomy laws to exclude same-sex couples. So while 
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sodomy laws were outdated for straight couples, they remained pertinent for same sex 
couples due to legal ideology rooted in morality.  
 Cases in reproductive rights gave the gay rights movement the legal hook they 
needed to bring sodomy laws to the Court. The right to privacy in Griswold was first 
articulated as a way to protect marital intimacy in the home. It was this appeal to 
intimacy within marriage that gave gay rights activists a way to speak to the Court about 
gay men and women’s intimacy that also needed protecting. Griswold provided the hook 
to privacy and Carey v. Population Services (1977) explicitly linked privacy, abortion, 
and sodomy when Justice Brennan stated that “The Court has not definitely answered the 
difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits State statutes 
regulating private consensual sexual behavior among adults.”  Here was an opportunity 117
to revisit sodomy laws after failures to challenge the state statutes before. The outcomes 
of New York’s People v. Onofre (1980) and Texas’s Baker v. Wade (1982) gave gay rights 
litigators the opportunity to revisit sodomy reform under both a privacy and equality 
argument. Onofre was caught in his home engaging in sexual activity with his younger 
male partner. It was Onofre’s private lawyer that tried to protect his client under his right 
to privacy and equal protection under the law. While the trial court denied these claims, 
the appeals court ruled in Onofre’s favor asserting that his private morality was protected 
under the right to privacy and the state did not have compelling interest to intervene.  118
This was the first time a state sodomy law was struck down as applied for same-sex 
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sexual acts. To give the litigators even more material, the Court ruled favorably for 
sodomy reform two years later. Baker, a teacher described as a “model citizen” but for his 
sexual orientation, also advocated for both his privacy and equality. The U.S. District 
Court agreed with Baker’s case and drew the same comparison as Justice Brennan did 
between contraceptive use and sexual acts. The Court ruled that “the right of two 
individuals to choose what type of sexual conduct they will enjoy in private is just as 
personal, just as important, just as sensitive—indeed, even more so—than the decision by 
the same couples to engage in sex using a contraceptive to prevent unwanted 
pregnancy.”  While this ruling was not representative of all, it is a good example of 119
when gay rights litigators benefited from the legal precedent previously established by 
the reproductive rights movement.  
 The legal precedent, while not well established, was there for litigators to make 
both a privacy and equal protection argument against sodomy laws. Litigators debated 
about which argument to rest their case on and eventually went with the privacy 
argument—Hardwick was arrested in his own bedroom and no situation seemed more 
compelling as that to rest a privacy argument on. However, the plan failed as the Court 
viewed the privacy argument to exist in notions of family, marriage, and procreation 
rather than more individual notions of privacy. Thus, they ruled that there was no 
protected right for same-sex sexual activity. Gay men and women, as well as pro-abortion 
arguments, were seen as destroying the “social fabric” by attempting to disrupt the 
 Baker v. Wade, 478 US 1022 (1986)119
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“maternal destiny” of women.  It would take convincing the Court that gay couples 120
were deserving of state legitimacy to protect sexual intimacy for homosexuals. This 
strategy would exclude single gay men and women, or couples uninterested, unable, or 
unwilling to assimilate to the traditional “social fabric” marriage provided.  
 While the 1980s seemed bleak for both movements, the separate struggles of each 
showed the emerging strength within the gay rights movement. While this is a 
comparative legal history, it is important to note what was occurring in the political 
climate of the time period.  While reproductive rights were under attack by the New 121
Right, “not a single state decriminalized sodomy in response to Bowers.”  Meanwhile, 122
abortion was made a wedge issue in the 1980 election and States were introducing, and 
still do, introduce an overwhelming amount of anti-abortion laws. During the reign of 123
the New Rights, feminist scholars again linked abortion rights with gay rights:  
 “In both the propaganda and policies of the Right, hostility to women’s autonomy  
 is the unifying link between opposition to abortion and opposition to other  
 feminist goals. Abortion rights are central to and have come to symbolize   
 women’s control. The Right  opposes that control in the broadest sense. That is  
 why they oppose sex education, government-funded contraception and family  
 planning clinics, gay rights… But their fight against abortion is the most virulent,  
 and they have made real gains.”  124
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The Court had to keep on revising exactly how much a woman’s privacy protected her 
right to an abortion, and in almost every case the protection encompassed less and less. 
While the blanket ruling of Roe created a ceiling for reproductive rights, it has also 
established a very conservative way of speaking about abortion rights that had more to do 
with the debate over the beginning of life and less to do with female autonomy. While the 
fight for abortion was in legal retreat, gay marriage litigators had the opportunity after 
Bowers to change the direction of their litigation.  A state-based strategy was a viable 125
option for gay-rights advocates. The U.S. District Court’s ruling in Baker was starkly 
different than the more dismissive ruling The Supreme Court made in Bowers. This was 
an indicator that the state constitution might be more inclusive to the rights of same-sex 
couples. Further, if the laws were litigated in state court, they would never reach the then 
hostile Supreme Court.   126
 Gay rights litigators from the ACLU and Lambda enacted this state-based 
litigation strategy after Hardwick. Each case challenged a sodomy law through a privacy 
argument. If the State’s law only referred to same-sex acts, then the lawyers would bring 
an equality argument as well. There was not uniform success, but from 1992 to 2003, 
nine States struck down sodomy laws. By the time the Court heard Lawrence v. Texas 
(2002), the strategy of the litigators had changed. This time, the lawyers were bringing 
both a federal and a state claim, thus getting ready to go to The Supreme Court with 
 Andersen, Ellen Ann. Out of the Closets and into the Courts : Legal Opportunity Structure and 125
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sodomy reform again. Some scholars deemed Lambdas efforts towards sodomy reform 
and marriage equality a success after the introduction of the equal protection argument. 
Lawrence overturned Bowers “in sweeping terms that recognized the dignity and worth 
of lgb people.”  What can be observed was that after litigants utilized equal protection 127
within the Court, they started winning cases. 
 After litigants for same-sex marriage adopted a equality argument, their 
movement succeed much more than the reproductive rights movement that was under 
privacy. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in Lawrence stating that Texas’s moral 
dislike of gays “is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy a rational basis review under 
the Equal Protection Clause.”  From here, Lambda won the case and established 128
precedent in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) on an equal protection argument. The same year, 
GLAD won its first marriage equality case in Massachusetts by only using a equal 
protection argument in Good Ridge v. Department of Public Health (2003).  The 129
strength in the Equal Protection argument under a moral theme originated in the 
jurisprudence of reproductive rights. The privacy argument appeased the morality of 
normative sexual encounters, just as the equal protection argument for same-sex marriage 
appeased the traditional ideology in marriage. But just as privacy failed to secure 
women’s autonomy in the face of anti-abortion legislation, so will equality. For gay 
rights, dealing with similar restrictions on sexuality, an Equal Protection argument based 
in the institution of marriage holds more legal ground when faced with disapproval from 
 Andersen, Ellen Ann (2005) pg. 121127
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judges. Yet if equality doctrine is adopted in this same logic by the reproductive rights 
movement, no real gains will be made towards sustaining an ideal of autonomy for 
women that is comparable to mens. I argue that this is because the concept of marriage 
that was used to inform the courts understanding of equality was an extension of the same 
private/public sphere logic that is ill suited to adequately provide women with the 
tangible rights necessary for full autonomy over their lives. 
A. Marriage as a Heteronormative Institution and the Construction of Female  
Autonomy  
———————————————————————————————————— 
 Gay rights and the surrounding scholarship on sexuality is much more than a 
focus on marriage. What started as a break from feminism, queer theory was suppose to 
challenge everything normative.   This certainly included the institution of marriage, 130
which had been well interpreted by feminists as a tool of  “‘cultural regulation’ and is not 
only a ‘vehicle for public policy’ but the vehicle by which the state shapes the public 
order into a ‘gendered order.’”  Cott, Pateman, and Brown all established a critique of 131
the institution of marriage as the states tool to keep the maternal role of women as the 
status quo. When marriage equality became the agenda for the gay rights movement, it 
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seemed almost counterintuitive for many activists. Throughout the legal and cultural fight 
for marriage equality, many notions of what equality is informed what a social movement 
was trying to make a singular discourse. Linking equality to the  institution of marriage 
constructed not only what marriage was before the Court, but what notions of individual 
equality and privacy meant as well.  
 In Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Court explicitly relied on the 
respectability of marriage to ground their rationale that same-sex couples should be 
allowed to enjoy this institution too. The Court decided that same-sex couples advocating 
for a right to marry “do not want marriage abolished. They do not attack the binary nature 
of marriage…” and thus there is no reason why they are denied to enjoy its protection. 
The Court ruled: 
  “Without question, civil marriage enhances the ‘welfare of the community.’ It is a 
 ‘social  institution of the highest importance.’…Civil marriage anchors an ordered  
 society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones. It is central to the  
 way the Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for the orderly   
 distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and   
 supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds…”  132
This excerpt clearly shows the assumptions about the “binary nature of marriage” and the 
roles individuals play to maintain this social order that will only prevail if gay people are 
allowed into the institution of marriage. In a liberal political tradition, marriage provides 
the bedrock for competitiveness that continues the production of society. While the civil 
sphere is nasty towards citizens, marriage and its feminized and privatized nature sustains 
safety and wellbeing for citizens. Protection is derived from the private sphere, yet it 
cannot survive without a maternal figure in it.  
 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)132
 80
 Gay marriage sustaining the “binary nature” of marriage is important because it 
informs what protections the maternal figure receives as an individual. Indeed, many 
queer critiques have come out against marriage equality, pointing out the extremely 
exclusionary nature of its rights discourse and thereby illegitimacy of any other forms of 
intimacy that are not binary.  However, these critiques focus mostly on the economic 133
side of the marriage argument and the effects neoliberalism has to freedom. Brandzel 
points out that “While it is true that same-sex-marriage advocates have critiqued the 
male/female and homosexual/heterosexual binaries latent in marriage, they have not 
attempted to undermine the sanctity of the domestic couple.”  Yet while all of these 134
critiques are important to the social movement, it has yet to inform the Courts rhetoric in 
its utility of the equality argument for marriage. For female individual rights, there are 
consequences of using the equality argument when this is its bedrock. Same-sex marriage 
discourse has informed the jurisprudence and thus the assumed status quo we live in. A 
status-quo that subordinates the feminine and disallows for women to be authors in their 
life. Married or not, white or not, straight or not, women are limited in their fluidity 
between the public and private. The feminine construction of individual autonomy 
derives from a logic that places deserving citizens as mothers in the home. While privacy 
is found behind closed doors of some assimilated married couples, it has not extended to 
women of all situations looking to make decisions about their bodies that yields the most 
integrity for them. 
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VI: Conclusion  
———————————————————————————————————— 
 I write as an advocate for women and reproductive rights. What is the best 
constitutional basis for women’s equality? To answer this question, I began by defining 
what I mean when I say equality. Given its many definitions and conceptions, I carved 
out a definition of gender equality that utilizes both liberal feminism and legal feminist 
theory: “every person should have the same freedom to structure his or her life” and you 
must apply leveled subjectivity to treat cases similarly in proportion to their differences. I 
followed the legal feminist methodology to uncover how the law negates difference to 
uphold the male norm. This discussion was critical for me to analyze what women need 
for equality in a patriarchy.  
 My hook into this feminist agenda was the prior research scholars such as Jill 
Lepore have started on the usefulness of the equality doctrine for the reproductive rights 
movement. Transparently, I began this research with the full intention of setting out to 
bolster the equality argument for a feminist agenda. But once I got to applying a feminist 
lens to the rhetoric of the Court, I discovered a unsettling yet freeing conclusion: no 
doctrine will be the feminist holy grail. It is far more important the arguments that 
litigants make and the focus drawn from these arguments that will reap benefits for 
women.  
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 Partly this research has been a discovery of the traps our words can fall into when 
we try to push one agenda over another. Gender discrimination case law showed how 
pushing for equality without addressing gender difference left reproductive rights under a 
much more restrictive protection of privacy. And in same-sex marriage, the use of 
equality left us with a re-entrenchment of the private/public dichotomy. A binary that 
scholars such as Carole Pateman have shown this dichotomy’s oppressive nature towards 
women. I conclude that the pitfall litigants and advocates ran into when utilizing the 
equality doctrine previously was a misconception of female autonomy. As stated above, 
for gender equality, there must be protected autonomy and leveled subjectivity. Gender 
discrimination case law used a “equality as sameness” approach, which resulted in a 
misapplication of leveled subjectivity. As seen in the pregnancy discrimination case law, 
women were left in the trap of having to prove their similarity to men as a prerequisite for 
equal treatment. Pregnant women were not able to do this due to the blatant exposure of 
their reproductive abilities, and thus received inadequate protection for being pregnant in 
the work place. The legal fight for same-sex marriage also utilized an equality argument 
that relied on the image of the feminine remaining in the private sphere. Both of these 
histories have contributed to a concept of female autonomy that does not result in gender 
equality. 
 In the recent arguments made by Justice Ginsburg in Hobby Lobby and 
Hellerstedt, there is a logical treatment of female autonomy that if followed, would 
deliver a robust delivery of women’s equality. Currently, the reproductive rights 
movement is limited in the arguments it can make due to its roots in the privacy doctrine. 
 83
Thus, we must be very trepidacious in every argument inside and outside the Court. I 
have documented how the privacy doctrine has been criticized by feminists as being 
inherently oppressive to women and the equality doctrine has also contributed to female 
oppression through its negative right interpretation. However, there has been moments of 
genuine delivery and activism towards gender equality in both of these doctrines 
histories. Katheryn Kolbert’s oral argument to the Court in Casey relied on rhetoric in 
Griswold that recognized that a woman cannot be truly equal in society without full 
control over her reproductive health life. Casey asked the Court to determine how 
abortion restrictions explicitly take away female autonomy over her own body and 
reproductive decisions. Casey resulted in the undue burden standard, which subsequently 
turned the abortion debate to be more focused on the protection of fetal life, rather than 
women’s autonomy. But in Hellerdest, Justice Ginsburg applied the undue burden 
standard in a new light. Instead of asking if the abortion restriction limits women, the 
Justice asked how it explicitly helps women. Our basis of review should strive for a 
affirmative protection of women, not just a limiting harm to them. This logic utilizes a 
positive concept and affirmative protection of female autonomy.  
 I argue for a legal path forward that is not tied to any one doctrine as a source of 
gender equality and substantive reproductive rights. The literature, and my own analysis, 
leads me to believe that it is far more important to weigh what logic is available within 
the Court against the necessary advocacy that must be done for a cause.  I believe that the 
use of equality and privacy doctrine have worked against the reproductive rights 
movement with the hope of speaking the Courts language to itself. The tyranny of 
 84
absolutes, the masculine norm of law, and the perceived threat to the status quo that is 
innate in an ask for abortion rights all work against the reproductive rights movement. 
Yet, the history has shown me that advocating for women with the goal of a robust 
delivery of gender equality is possible, even within these conditions. In an ideal world 
with progressive legal, cultural, and political conditions, I envision a very different legal 
approach than the one I see as possible right now. I believe that a positive approach to 
equality is the highest level of affirmative protection reproductive rights advocates can 
work towards in a liberal political system. Demanding contraception coverage, abortion 
access, childcare, maternity leave, and welfare programs to accommodate for women's 
reproductive capabilities is the most inclusive way to make genuine authorship and 
autonomy for women a reality. But we are far from living in this world, and I am aware 
of that. Yet I believe that working with that legal basis as the goal can inform the 
movements language and legal decisions. If we cannot have positive equality now, that 
does not mean we need to continue to work along the logic that has already worked 
against the movements goal. Curtailing arguments and doctrine to advance women’s 
position, resources, respect, individualism, and autonomy is the way forward. For now, I 
have documented what the limitations and strengths of the privacy and equality doctrine 
are for the reproductive rights movement. I acknowledge that my analysis has only been 
on these limited histories so far, yet I conclude with a freeing notion-doctrine should not 
be treated as a linear way of thinking about reproductive rights. Reproductive rights is a 
highly variable and dynamic concept, unique and essential for every women’s autonomy. 
Such a robust aspect of life, the very continuation of life, should not be restricted to 
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limited concepts of any doctrine the Court has developed thus far. Every argument should 
work towards creating inclusive precedent, rather than refining the argument to the norms 
already prevailing in law and culture. Legally, I believe a positive rights iteration gives 
even privacy this possibility- as seen in the work of Justice Ginsburg.  
 At the beginning of this thesis, I wished to find hope in the synergy between 
equality and privacy frameworks that if used together, can give way to a robust concept 
of female autonomy that will advance the feminist goal of articulating what gender 
equality requires in a patriarchy. I conclude that at all criticisms and successes of privacy 
and equality doctrine weave into the suppression and protection of female autonomy. At 
the intersection of privacy and equality positive rights, there is a robust concept of 
autonomy that would free women from the private sphere and allow for a dismantling of 
the private/public gendering that works to limit femininity.  
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